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Thomas Wylton's Question
"An contingit dare ultimum rei
permanentis in esse"
CECILIA TRIFOGLI
In his Questions on Aristotle's Physics 8,1 Thomas Wyl-
ton deals extensively with the problem of assigning temporal limits to
the existence of permanent things, as, for instance, of fire, of water,
and of a substance's being hot. Wylton's discussion of this problem
is incorporated into the question "An contingit dare ultimum rei
permanentis in esse," which represents his major contribution to that
large body of medieval literature concerning the so-called de primo et
ultimo instanti or de incipit et desinit problem or, more synthetically, the
limit decision problem.2
1. Thomas Wylton was Fellow of Merton College in the last decade of the
thirteenth century and during the first years of the fourteenth. He was Magister
Artium in Oxford probably until 1304. In the second decade of the fourteenth century
he was Magister Theologίae in Paris. The Quaestiones libri Physicσrum constitute his
main extant work in natural philosophy. Although this work has not yet been
dated, it is very likely to have been written before the 1304-1305 school year,
that is, when Wylton was still Magister Artium in Oxford. For the bibliography on
Wylton's biography and works, see Trifogli, "II problema dello statuto ontologico del
tempo nelle Quaestiones super Physicam di Thomas Wylton e di Giovanni di Jandun,"
Documenti e studi sulla tradiwne filosofica medievale 1 (1990): 491-495.
2. In using the expression "limit decision problem," I follow Murdoch and Knu-
uttila. See John E. Murdoch, "Propositional Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Natural
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Since the publication in 1956 of Curtis Wilson's pioneering work
William Hey tesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics,3
this problem area has been capturing increasing interest among his-
torians of medieval philosophy and logic. They have pointed out that
in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century discussions of the limit decision
problem some of the most original aspects of the medieval treatment
of Aristotle's theory of continuity are to be found.4 Although some
representative medieval texts have been edited since then,5 most
source material is not yet available.
In this essay I shall provide a critical edition of Thomas Wylton's
question "An contingit dare ultimum rei permanentis in esse." As an
Philosophy: A Case Study," Synthese 40 (1979): 117-146; Simo Knuuttila, "Remarks
on the Background of the Fourteenth Century Limit Decision Controversies," in The
Editing of Theological and Philosophical Texts from the Middle Ages, ed. Monika Asztalos,
Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, Studia Latina Stockholmiensia 30 (Stockholm:
Almqvist and Wikseil, 1986), pp. 245-266.
3. Curtis Wilson, William Hey tesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical
Physics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), especially pp. 32-56.
4. Among the most relevant studies are Norman Kretzmann, "Incipit/Desinit,"
in Motion and Time, Space and Matter, ed. P. K. Machamer and R. G. Turnbull
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), pp. 101-136; Kretzmann, "Socrates
Is Whiter than Plato Begins To Be White," Nous 11 (1977): 3-15: John E. Murdoch
and Edith Dudley Sylla, "The Science of Motion," in Science in the Middle Agesy ed.
David C. Lindberg, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp.
241-246; Murdoch, "Propositional Analysis," pp. 117-146; Murdoch, "The Analytic
Character of Late Medieval Learning: Natural Philosophy without Nature," in Ap-
proaches to Nature in the Middle Ages, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies
16 (Binghamton: SUNY Press, 1982), pp. 183-200; Lauge Olaf Nielsen, "Thomas
Bradwardine's Treatise on Ίncipit' and Όesinit'," CIMAGL 42 (1982): 6-43; Alain de
Libera, "La problematique de Pinstant du changement au XIIIe siecle: Contribution
a Phistoire des sophismata physicalia" in Studies in Medieval Natural Philosophy, ed.
Stefano Caroti, Biblioteca di Nuncius: Studi e testi (Florence: Olschki, 1989), pp.
43-93.
5. See, for instance, Herman and Charlotte Shapiro, "De primo et ultimo instanti
des Walter Burley," Archivfύr Geschichte der Phύosophie 47 (1965): 157-173; Nielsen,
"Thomas Bradwardine's Treatise," pp. 47-83. Moreover, some mostly anonymous
thirteenth-century sophismata on indpit and desinit have been edited very recently
by Andrea Tabarroni, "Ίncipit' and 'desinit' in a Thirteenth-Century Sophismata-
collection," CIMAGL 59 (1989): 61-111; Alain de Libera, "Le sophisma anonyme
'Sor desinit esse non desinendo esse' du Cod. Parisinus 16135," CIMAGL 59 (1989):
113-120; Sten Ebbesen, "Three Thirteenth-Century Sophismata about Beginning
and Ceasing," CIMAGL 59 (1989): 121-180.
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introduction to Wylton's text, I shall offer an analysis of the salient
points of his treatment of the limit decision problem. Since Wylton's
question originates from Aristotle's discussion about this topic in
Physics 8.8, I shall first sketch the relevant Aristotelian background.
THE ARISTOTELIAN BACKGROUND
Aristotle deals with the limit decision problem in Physics
6.5 and 8.8.6 His own doctrine is extremely complicated and deserves
an attentive examination. Such an effort, however, is beyond the
scope of this essay.7 I shall rather restrict myself to indicating those
elements of Aristotle's treatment that are essential for understanding
the nature of the limit decision problem as discussed by Wylton.8
Schematically, this problem arises when one tries to describe a
change which occurs within a continuous time. According to the
Aristotelian definition of continuity,9 given any period of time, what'
ever instant one chooses within it, this instant divides (conceptually)
the given period into two parts, and it represents the common limit at
which they join. Thus, the dividing instant belongs to both temporal
parts into which it divides a period of time and it must be regarded
both as the last instant of the first part and as the first instant of the
second part.
Aristotle and his medieval followers generally perceived no diffi-
culties with this account of the continuity of time and, in particular,
6. Aristotle Physics 6.5 (236a7-bl8), 8.8 (263b9-264a6).
7. For a detailed analysis and discussion of Aristotle's treatment of the limit de-
cision problem, see especially Richard Sorabji, "Aristotle on the Instant of Change,"
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society suppl. vol 50 (1976): 69-89, repr. with revisions
in Articles on Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Sorabji (London:
Duckworth, 1979), 3:159-177; Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (London:
Duckworth, 1983), pp. 403-418.
8. On the Aristotelian background of the medieval discussions, see also Wilson,
William Heytesbury, pp. 29-32; Kretzmann, "Incipit/Desinit," pp. 101-103; Knuuttila,
"Remarks on the Background," pp. 246-251; Nielsen, "Thomas Bradwardine's Trea-
tise," pp. 6-8; and Kretzmann, "Continuity, Contrariety, Contradiction, and Change,"
in Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought, ed. Kretzmann (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 270-274.
9. Aristotle Physics 5.3 (227alO-17).
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with the assumption that the same instant can serve both as a limit of
one time'Segment and as a limit of the next time-segment.1 0 Conse-
quently, as far as the continuity of time alone is concerned, no limit
decision problem arises, that is, it is not necessary to decide whether
the dividing instant is to be ascribed to the first time-segment or to
the second, since it can be safely ascribed to both.
A limit decision problem, however, does arise when a transition
from one state to another occurs in the dividing instant, especially
if the two states in question are contradictories, i.e., they allow no
intermediate state. Taking one of the most common examples in
medieval discussions, if the instant in which Socrates changes from
being to not-being is focused on, then it seems impossible to maintain
that this dividing instant belongs both to the period of time in which
Socrates exists and to the period of time in which Socrates does not
exist, i.e., that it is both the last instant of Socrates' being and the first
instant of Socrates' not-being, since this would imply a violation of the
law of non-contradiction, for in the same instant Socrates would exist
and would not exist.1 1 Furthermore, it is impossible to maintain that
this instant belongs neither to the period of time in which Socrates
exists nor to that in which he does not, since this would imply a
10. A survey of the medieval treatment of Aristotle's theory of continuity is
found in Annaliese Maier, Die Vσrldufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert (Rome: Edizioni di
Storia e Letteratura, 1949), pp. 155-179. See also Wolfgang Breidert, Das aristotelische
Kontinuum in der Scholastϊk, BGPTMA NF 1 (Mϋnster: Aschendorff, 1970). Wylton's
discussion about continuity is mainly found in the first two questions on Physics
6: q. 1, "Utrum continuum permanens componatur ex indivisibilibus"; q. 2, "Utrum
continuum successivum componatur ex indivisibilibus." The two are found in Cesena,
Biblioteca Malatestiana, MS. Plut. VIII sin. 2, if. 95 v a line 4-100va line 8 ab imo. In
what follows, my references to Wylton's question "An contingit dare ultimum rei
permanentis in esse" (Physics 8, q. 6) will be to the critical edition contained in
the Appendix below, whereas my references to other sections of his Quaestiones libri
Physicorum will be to this Cesena manuscript.
11. In solving the limit decision problem, however, a small group of medieval
authors supported a doctrine that allows the simultaneous existence of contradictories.
On this doctrine, see Simo Knuuttila and Anya Inkeri Lehtinen, "Change and
Contradiction: A Fourteenth-Century Controversy," Synthese 40 (1979): 189-207;
Knuuttila, "Remarks on the Background," pp. 258-261; Kretzmann, "Continuity," pp.
274-284; Paul V. Spade, "Quasi-Aristotelianism," in Infinity and Continuity in Ancient
and Medieval Thought, ed. Kretzmann (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1982), pp. 297-307.
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violation of the law of the excluded middle, for in this instant Socrates
would neither exist nor not exist. Thus, it is necessary to decide
whether the instant of transition is to be assigned to the period in
which Socrates exists or to that in which he does not. According
to the first alternative, there is a last instant of Socrates' being, but
there is no first instant of Socrates' not-being, or, equivalently, the
period of time in which Socrates exists is limited intrinsically by
the instant of transition, since this instant belongs to it, whereas the
period of time in which Socrates does not exist is limited extrinsically
by the instant of transition, since this instant does not belong to
it. According to the second alternative, there is no last instant of
Socrates' being, but there is a first instant of Socrates' not-being, i.e.,
Socrates' bejng is extrinsically limited, whereas Socrates' not-being is
intrinsically limited.
The solution to the limit decision problem posed by a change
occurring within a continuous time thus consists in the choice of one
of the two alternatives just outlined. But for Aristotle himself and,
more explicitly, for medieval authors there is no universal solution to
this problem, in the sense that the ascription or the denial of a first
instant or of a last instant to a state involved in a change depends
on the permanent or successive nature of such a state. The most
common distinction, therefore, invoked by medieval authors who deal
with the limit decision problem is the distinction between permanent
things, i.e., things whose parts exist simultaneously, as, for instance,
an individual substance, and successive things, i.e., things whose parts
exist only successively, as, for instance, a run made by Socrates.
Wylton himself uses this distinction. He devotes, however, no
specific discussion to the limit decision problem concerning succes-
sive things. In regard to this issue he simply restates what is taken
to be Aristotle's solution, according to which a successive thing is
extrinsically limited both at its beginning and at its end.12 On the
other hand, he is not completely satisfied with Aristotle's solution
to the limit decision problem for permanent things. Aristotle deals
specifically with the ceasing of a permanent thing, as for instance
the passage from being white to being not-white, and he argues that
12. See Aristotle Physics 6.5 (236a7-18); Thomas Wylton in Physicam, ff. 104vb
line 15 ab imo-105ra line 8.
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there is no last instant of being white. The conclusion is that being
white is extrinsically limited, since it is limited by the first instant of
being not-white. Wylton agrees with Aristotle's conclusion about the
denial of a last instant of being white, but he also maintains that this
conclusion cannot be extended to all kinds of permanent things.13
Accordingly, the bulk of his question "An contingit dare ultimum
rei permanentis in esse" is devoted to introducing subdivisions within
the category of permanent things, to establishing to which kinds of
permanent things a last instant of being is to be ascribed or denied,
and to explaining the criteria on which such an ascription or denial
is based.
The following analysis of Wylton's question is articulated in two
parts. These parts correspond to the main distinction introduced by
him into the category of permanent things, namely, the distinction
between what he calls positive permanent forms (as, for instance, hot,
fire) and privative permanent forms (as, for instance, not-hot, not-
run). The nature of this distinction between positive and privative
permanent forms is not completely evident and it seems difficult to
find a clear-cut reason which led Wylton to introduce it. I shall go into
more detail concerning this problem in the second part of my analysis.
For the time being, I shall concentrate on Wylton's treatment of the
limit decision problem in the case of positive permanent forms, which
represents the major and most interesting section of his question.
POSITIVE PERMANENT FORMS
Wylton subdivides positive permanent forms into forms
admitting a latitude of degrees in which they possess the form (latitude*
in gradibus)y i.e., a range within which their form can vary according to
different degrees, and forms possessing invariable degrees. Under the
first kind of forms he classifies, for instance, white, hot, fire, water;
under the second kind of forms he classifies a particular degree of
heat, the moving body's being in a particular place, and a quantity
like two-cubits long.1^
13. Thomas Wylton in Physicam 8.6, sections [2.1]-[2.5] and [3.8.2]-[3.8.3].
14. Thomas Wylton in Physicam 8.6, section [2.1] at "Intelligendo enim.. . ."
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The classification of substantial forms, like that of fire or of water,
under the class of forms having a latitude of degrees is in sharp contrast
with the Aristotelian doctrine according to which substantial forms
are indivisible.15 Wylton himself follows Aristotle's teaching in other
sections of his commentary on the Physics, and he argues in these
places that a substantial form is not subject to intension and remission
of degrees.16 This contrast, however, only reflects Wylton's inaccurate
use of the technical language of the intension and remission of forms
in his description of the difference between two kinds of positive
permanent forms. Yet this is irrelevant to the subsequent discussion
about the problem of the last instant of being. For, in Wylton's view,
what is relevant to this problem is not the difference in the ontological
structure of these two kinds of forms, but a more physical difference,
concerning the way in which both types of forms pass into not-being.
A form having a latitude of degrees is corrupted through a temporal
process during which it takes on successively different degrees until it
is transformed into another form, whereas the passing into not-being
of an indivisible form, as, for instance, a particular degree of heat,
cannot be a temporal process during which it varies, since it admits
no variation. On the other hand, although a substantial form does
not in itself admit a latitude of degrees, nevertheless its corruption is
a successive process, as Wylton argues at length in his commentary
on Physics 5.17 During this process, the qualities which are essentially
joined to this form (as, for instance, heat in the case of the sub-
stantial form of fire) undergo an intension or remission in degrees.
Consequently, if the distinction between forms having a latitude of
degrees and invariable forms is interpreted as a distinction between
forms which pass into not-being during a period of time and forms
which pass into not-being instantaneously, Wylton's classification of
substantial forms under the class of forms that pass into not-being
during a period of time is in agreement with his position on the
nature of substantial change, i.e., generation and corruption.
15. Aristotle Metaphysics 8.3 (1043b32-1044al4).
16. See especially Thomas Wylton in Physicam 5.3, "Utrum ad substantiam sit
motus," ίί 80ra line 9-82ra line 1 ab imo.
17. Thomas Wylton in Physicam 5.2, "Utrum generatio secundum quod est per se
mutatio distincta a motu sit subita vel successiva," ίί. 78rl? line 15—80ra line 8.
98 CECILIA TRIFOGLI
The difference between the passing into not-being of forms having
a latitude of degrees and that of invariable forms is regarded by Wylton
as the main ground on which the solution of the limit decision prob-
lem for positive permanent forms must be based. From this difference
he infers that for forms passing into not-being in time no last instant
of being is to be ascribed, but such an instant is to be ascribed to
forms passing into not-being instantaneously.
Wylton's argumentation in favor of this asymmetry in the solution
of the limit decision problem for positive permanent forms is rather
compressed,18 so that it is difficult to detect all the assumptions he uses
and to spell out their interrelations. It is easier, however, and even
more interesting, to attempt a reconstruction of the general strategy
he adopts in dealing with this problem. In a preliminary way, this
strategy can be outlined as follows: Wylton's argumentation stresses
some specifically physical features of the passing into not-being of
permanent forms; this leads him to stress also the relationship between
the last instant of being of these forms and the last instant of the
physical processes through which they change from being to not-being.
As a result of this physical approach, the solution of the limit deci-
sion problem for permanent forms turns out to be almost completely
determined by the solution of the same problem for successive things,
and, in particular, for motion, a solution that, according to Wylton,
has already been established by Aristotle in Physics 6.5.
In order to clarify the strategy just outlined, I shall exemplify it
with the case of being hot (calidum) and the case of having a singular
degree of heat, e.g., caHdissimum. The passage from being hot to being
not-hot, as, for instance, to being temperate, is described in physical
terms as follows: the hot body, remaining hot, undergoes a temporal
process (mutatio continua) consisting of the remission of heat, at the
end of which it is no longer hot, but temperate. This description,
however, does not hold for the alternation from having a singular
degree of heat to not having it, since the indivisibility of such a
degree is incompatible with the successive character of a change. In
this case, one has to say that the body having a singular degree of
heat is at rest with respect to this degree for some time, and when a
differently qualified body starts acting on it, this degree is destroyed
and so no longer exists.
18. Thomas Wylton in Physicam 8.6, sections [2.2]-[2.4]
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According to this difference between the physical descriptions of
passing into not-being of being hot and of particular degrees of heat,
Wylton maintains that the instant of transition from being to not-
being must be differently described in the two cases: the instant of
transition from being hot to being not-hot is the terminus mutationis,
Le., the final temporal limit of the change which takes place in the
hot body, whereas the instant of transition from being calidissimum to
being not-calidissimum is the terminus quietis, i.e., the final temporal
limit of the body's state of rest with respect to being calidissimum.
On the other hand, the terminus mutationis does not belong to
mutatio itself, since mutatio, being a successive entity, is extrinsically
limited at its end. Rather it belongs to the state in which change
has been completed. The terminus quietis, however, belongs to the
state of rest, in the sense that in this terminus the body is still at rest
with respect to being calidissimum. Wylton's main ground for this last
conclusion depends, as it seems, once more on the solution of the
limit decision problem for successive entities.19 In the case of a body
changing from being calidissimum that he is considering here, the state
of rest is followed by a state of change, namely, that in which the
action exerted on it by a differently qualified natural substance has
its effect. Thus the instant of transition between these two states can
be regarded not only as the terminus quietisy but also as the principium
motus. On the other hand, however, the principium motus does not
belong to motion itself, because motion is extrinsically limited at its
beginning. Therefore, Wylton concludes, it must belong to the state
of rest with respect to being calidissimum.
Thus, the main result of Wylton's argumentation can be reformu-
lated as follows: there is no last instant of a body's change from being
hot to being not-hot, but there is a last instant of a body's resting
with respect to a particular degree of heat.
It is clear that so far this result concerns the temporal limits of the
change of the hot body and of the rest of the body having a partic-
ular degree of heat, but it does not yet concern the temporal limits
themselves of being hot and of being characterized by a particular
degree of heat. In order to fill in this gap, some assumptions about
the relationship between the temporal extension of the existence of
19. Thomas Wylton in Physicam 8.6, section [2.4] at "Causa quare contingit
dare.. . ."
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motion and of rest and that of the existence of the forms involved in
them are necessary.
Wylton himself resorts, more or less explicitly, to these kinds of
assumptions. In the case of a body's change from being hot, he
assumes that the existence of being hot is coextensive with that of this
change.20 Accordingly, since there is no last instant of this change,
there is no last instant of being hot, i.e., there is no last instant in the
terminus mutationis when being hot no longer exists. In the case of a
body's change from being calίdissimumy he argues that the existence
of being calidissimum is coextensive with the body's state of rest with
respect to being calidissimum. Accordingly, since there is a last instant
of rest with respect to being calidissimum, there is also a last instant
of being calidissimum, i.e., there is a last instant in the terminus quietis
when being calidissimum still exists.21
The asymmetry in the assignment of temporal limits to forms hav-
ing a latitude of degrees and to invariable forms represents the major
innovation which Wylton introduces into the traditional Aristotelian
treatment of the limit decision problem for permanent entities, as it
is found in Physics 8.8. Due to his innovation he will have to defend
this asymmetry against some objections.22
One of them in particular deserves a close examination, because it
both points out the physical character of Wylton's approach to the
20. Thomas Wylton In Physicam 8.6, section [2.3] at "Tota autem causa. . ."; see
also section [3.1.1]. This assumption is used by Aristotle himself in the argument
of Physics S.8 (263b9-264a6). In other passages, however, he offers an analysis of
change that contrasts with this assumption. In Physics 6.4 (234b 10-20), for instance,
he argues that during the change from one state to another both these states inhere
partially in the changing body and not only the initial state. On this inconsistency
in Aristotle's theory of change, see Sorabji, "Aristotle," pp. 78-85. There is no such
inconsistency in Wylton's theory of change. He constantly supports the doctrine that,
as long as a change lasts, only the initial state of this change inheres in the moving
body and the final state does not yet exist. For Wylton's doctrine of change, see
especially Thomas Wylton in Physicam 3.7, "Utrum motus sit aliquo modo in genere
termini ad quern est motus," ff. 35 r b line 12 ab imo-39ra line 13.
21. Thomas Wylton In Physicam 8.6, section [2.4] at "Causa quare contingit
dare.. . ." For an analysis of the asymmetry between motion and rest, which Wylton
exploits in his argumentation, see especially Sorabji, "Aristotle," pp. 71-77.
22. Thomas Wylton In Physicam 8.6, sections [1.7.1]—[1.8].
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limit decision problem and it indicates some difficulties in his position.
In this objection,23 it is assumed that a form having a latitude of
degrees can vary between a minimum degree (gradus maxime remissus)
and a maximum degree. On this basis the following inference is
formulated: if there is a last instant of the existence of the minimum
degree of heat, then there is also a last instant of the existence of being
hot, since these two instants coincide. The validity of this inference
is illustrated with the case of a body which rests under the minimum
degree of heat for some time and then it is brought into contact with
a cold body, which starts acting on it. If one allows a last instant of
the body's resting with respect to the minimum degree of heat, then
one is seemingly forced to allow also a last instant of the body's being
hot, since the last instant of the body's resting with respect to such a
degree is also the last instant of the body's being hot.
In order to avoid the inference from a last instant of a minimum
degree of heat to a last instant of being hot, Wylton is expected to
resort to some assumptions about the ontological structure of a form
having a latitude of degrees. He might, for instance, deny a maximum
and a mininum degree of heat. He does not, however, resort to this
kind of assumption, but to a more physical kind. For the crucial point
in his reply is not the denial of a minimum and a maximum degree
of heat, but the denial of a natural body's rest with respect to these
two extreme degrees.24 Accordingly, he seems to maintain that these
degrees are always acquired by the natural body during a process of
intension or remission of heat.
Although Wylton does not clearly state his solution to the ob-
jection, it is apparently the following: if, for instance, the minimum
degree of heat is acquired during a process of remission of heat, which
ends at the reception of another quality, like temperate, then it is
possible both to assign a last instant of being to such a degree and
deny a last instant of being hot. For, during this change, the natural
body takes on each degree of heat and, in particular, the minimum
degree just for an instant (because otherwise it would be resting with
respect to such a degree), which is consequently both the first and
23. Thomas Wylton In Physicam 8.6, section [1.7.4].
24. Thomas Wylton in Physicam 8.6, section [3.7.2].
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the last instant of the existence of this degree. On the other hand,
there is no last instant of being hot, since this instant is the terminus
mutationiSy in which, in Wylton's view, being hot no longer exists.25
Wylton's treatment of the objection based on the extreme degrees
of a quality against the asymmetry in the solution of the limit decision
problem for permanent forms is in agreement with the strategy he
adopts in dealing with this problem, which has been outlined above.
For, in order to show how it is possible to reconcile the assignment of
a last instant of the extreme degrees of a quality and the denial of a
last instant of this quality itself, Wylton assumes that a careful exam-
ination of the physical circumstances under which these qualitative
determinations exist in natural substances is necessary.
Wylton's solution of this objection, however, is not fully satisfac-
tory. To begin with, the crucial point of his solution is the denial of a
natural body's rest with respect to the extreme degrees of a quality. Yet
this is in contrast with his main argument in favor of the ascription
of a last instant of being to an indivisible degree, in which the state
of rest with respect to this degree is regarded as the essential requisite
for such an ascription. Wylton perceives this inconsistency and he
attempts a solution, which is, however, rather obscure.26
Secondly, even the denial of a body's rest with respect to the
minimum and maximum degrees of heat, and the consequent claim
that these degrees are always possessed by a natural substance during
a process of intension or remission of heat, do not seem sufficient
to avoid the objection against the asymmetry in the solution of the
limit decision problem for permanent forms. For, regardless of the
fact that the last instant of being of the minimum degree of heat
occurs in a process of remission of heat or in a state of rest, the
conclusion that this instant is also the last instant of being hot seems
inevitable, since it follows from the definition of a minimum degree
itself. Thus, in order to avoid the inference from the existence of a
25. This is probably the meaning of Wylton's argument in section [3.7.2] at "Nam,
cum omnia talίa.. . ."
26. This solution consists of the following distinction: a natural substance, like
fire, can be resting with respect to an extreme degree, like calidissimum, only when
it is in its natural place, where no contrary natural substance exerts an action on it.
Yet such a rest is impossible when fire is acted on by a contrary natural substance.
Thomas Wylton in Physicam 8.6, sections [3.7.3]—[3.7.4].
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last instant of the minimum degree of heat to the existence of a last
instant of heat, it seems necessary to reject the existence of extreme
degrees. A more adequate analysis of this problem, however, requires
a careful investigation into Wylton's theory of the latitude of forms
and of intension and remission processes, which will be the argument
of another essay.27
PRIVATIVE PERMANENT FORMS
In the second part of his discussion of the limit decision
problem for permanent entities,28 Wylton deals with permanent forms
that are "privations" of other forms, either successive, like non cursus,
or permanent, like non album. These privations are distinguished from
positive permanent forms.
Although he does not declare the nature of the distinction be-
tween positive permanent forms and privative permanent forms, this
is very probably to be interpreted as a conceptual distinction, not as
a real one. This means that there is only one kind of real permanent
forms, according to Wylton, namely positive permanent forms. Yet
each of them can be described as the privation of another form,
as, for instance, temperate can be also described as not-hot. And
although Wylton assumes that the ascription or the denial of temporal
limits to permanent forms depends on their ontological and physical
characteristics, and not on the conceptual ways in which they are
described, nevertheless his discussion about the limit decision problem
for privative permanent forms is not a mere repetition of his treatment
of the case of positive permanent forms. This is due to the fact that
he does not focus on the real nature underlying a privative form,
but on the privative character itself and on the "positive" entity
to which such a privation refers. Accordingly, Wylton draws some
distinctions within the category of privative permanent forms which
correspond to the main distinctions within the category of positive
27. For an analysis of similar problems which arise in Walter Burley's theory of
qualitative change, see Edith Dudley Sylla, "Infinite Indivisibles and Continuity in
Fourteenth-Century Theories of Alteration," in Infinity and Continuity, pp. 231-247.
28. Thomas Wylton in Physicam 8.6, section [2.5].
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entities.29 Thus he distinguishes between two main kinds of privative
forms. The first consists of forms that are privations of successive
entities, as, for instance, not-run. The second consists of forms that
are privations of permanent entities, like not-white. The latter kind
is subdivided into two types: the first consisting of forms that are
privations of forms having a latitude of degrees; the second consisting
of forms that are privations of invariable forms. Consequently, because
of Wylton's major concern with the privative character of privative
permanent forms, it is not completely arbitrary to abandon in the
following exposition the odd notion of privative permanent form and
to speak, in a more traditionally Aristotelian way, of the "not-being"
(non esse) of different kinds of entities, as Wylton himself does in his
subsequent discussion.30
Accordingly, the distinction between the two main parts into which
Wylton's treatment of the limit decision problem is articulated can be
more clearly reformulated as follows. In the first (concerning positive
permanent forms) he deals with the ascription of temporal limits to
the being of permanent things, whereas in the second (concerning
privative permanent forms) he deals with the ascription of temporal
limits to the not-being of both permanent and successive things.
On the other hand, once temporal limits have been assigned to the
being of a certain thing, then, according to the common medieval
view and to Wylton as well, the ascription of temporal limits to its
not-being is reduced to a mere application of a general rule, which
might be labelled the compatibility rule.
To put it in a synthetic way, the rule states that if intrinsic temporal
limits are assigned to a thing's being, then extrinsic temporal limits
must be assigned to its not-being, and, vice versa, if extrinsic temporal
limits are assigned to its being, then intrinsic temporal limits must be
assigned to its not-being.
29. Thomas Wylton in Physicam 8.6, section [2.5] at "De secundo membro. . .
permanentium vel successivarum" and "Si loquamur de negatione. . . alicuius per-
fectionis indivisibilis."
30. Thomas Wylton In Physicam 8.6, section [2.5] at "Si primo modo.. . ." It
should be noted, however, that the identification of a privative permanent entity
with the not-being of another entity does not explain Wylton's insistence on the
permanent character of such a privative entity.
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A complete formulation of this rule is found in Walter Burley's
treatise Όe primo et ultimo instantO1 He articulates the compatibility
rule in four rules, which derive from expressing temporal limits in
terms of a first instant and a last instant and from taking into account
both the case of a thing's being preceding its not-being and the case
of a thing's being following its not-being- Thus, according to Bur-
ley's compatibility rules, for any entity there are only four admissible
relations between the temporal limits of its being and of its not-being:
(1) If there is a first instant of its being, then there is no last instant
of its not-being.
(2) If there is no first instant of its being, then there is a last instant
of its not-being-
(3) If there is a last instant of its being, then there is no first instant
of its not-being.
(4) If there is no last instant of its being, then there is a first instant
of its not-being.
With the help of Burley's clear formulation, it is easy to find out
that these four rules have a common ground. They are constituted by
the necessity of ascribing the dividing instant between being and not-
being, namely, the instant of transition, to just one of these two states.
Consequently, they can be regarded as an alternative formulation of
the limit decision problem as I have outlined it in a previous section
of this essay.
Although Wylton himself does not devote a separate exposition
to the compatibility rules, he does rely on them in order to establish
which kind of temporal limits must be ascribed to the not-being of
an entity, once the temporal limits of its being have been ascribed.
Thus, his solution of the limit decision problem for the not-being of
an entity consists of three main conclusions which correspond to the
three main kinds of entities he considers, namely, successive entities,
variable permanent entities, invariable permanent entities:
(1) For successive entities, there is both a first instant and a last
instant of not-being, since there is neither a last instant of
being nor a first instant of being.
31. See Shapiro and Shapiro, "De primo et ultimo instanti," p. 166, lines 8-20.
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(2) For divisible permanent entities, there is a first instant of not-
being, since there is no last instant of being- There is, however,
no last instant of not-being, since there is a first instant of
being.
(3) For indivisible permanent entities, there is neither a first in-
stant of not-being nor a last instant of not-being, since there
is both a first instant and a last instant of being.32
In conclusion, the compatibility rules provide Wylton with an
immediate solution to the limit decision problem for "privative per-
manent forms," since in virtue of them such a solution is completely
determined by the results of his discussion about positive permanent
forms and successive entities.
It should be remarked, however, that these rules, despite their
logical character, impose some restrictions on the kinds of entities
which can follow one another in time. The necessity for these restric-
tions becomes clear if, instead of speaking abstractly of the not-being
of an entity, one asks more concretely which state or entity exists
immediately before and immediately after its being. For instance, if
a successive entity is considered, then according to the compatibility
rule what exists immediately after it cannot be another successive
entity, because both of them are extrinsically limited. Although Wyl-
ton was not completely unaware of this problem area, he does not,
however, face it in his treatment of the limit decision problem.33
CONCLUSION
I shall conclude my introduction to Wylton's question
"An contingit dare ultimum rei permanentis in esse" by identifying
32. Thomas Wylton in Physicam 8.6, section [2.5] at "Si successivarum, semper . . .
non mensuretur instanti, sed tempore" and "Si primo modo. . ." to the end of the
section.
33. See especially Thomas Wylton In Physicam 6.2, "Utrum continuum succes-
sivum componatur ex indivisibilibus," ff. 97 v b line 12 ab ΐmo-100va line 8 ab imo;
and 8.5, "An motus reflexus sit unus simpliciter," ff. 129ra line 16-13 l r b line 13. For
an analysis of the problem which arises in the transition from a successive state to
another successive state, see especially Kretzmann, "Incipit/Desinit," pp. 114-116.
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its doctrinal and historical position within the medieval discussions
of the limit decision problem.
As to the doctrinal context, I shall rely on the results of some
comprehensive works on this problem, such as those by Wilson, Kret-
zmann, Murdoch, and Knuuttila.3^ Schematically, these scholars dis-
tinguish two main strands in the medieval treatment of the limit
decision problem: the physical strand and the logical strand. Roughly
speaking, in the physical strand the objects of the analysis are physical
entities, namely, first and last instants, and the tools of the analysis
are physical theories, such as the continuity of time, the structure of
change and of the formal determinations involved in change. In the
logical strand the objects of the analysis are propositions containing
the terms "incίpit" and "desinit" and they are analyzed with logi-
cal tools or, to use J. E. Murdoch's expression, metalinguistically.35
Although propositional analysis is not totally absent in Wylton's
discussion,36 the physical approach is, however, clearly dominant,
since, as has been pointed out in the previous sections, the distinctions
he draws into the category of permanent entities, the arguments he
uses for establishing the main points of his solution and, finally,
the most relevant objections he faces have all a physical meaning.
Accordingly, Wylton's question must be regarded as an example of
the physical approach to the limit decision problem.
Historically, a final identification of Wylton's position requires
an investigation into the second half of thirteenth-century English
tradition of commentaries on the Physics, which still has to be made. 3 7
34. See especially Wilson, "William Heytesbury," pp. 31-56; Kretzmann, "In-
cipit/Desinit," pp. 103-121; Murdoch, "Propositional Analysis," pp. 118-138; Knu-
uttila, "Remarks," pp. 251-258.
35. See, for instance, Murdoch, "Propositional Analysis," p. 122.
36. See Thomas Wylton In Physicam 8.6, section [2.5] at "Et ideo, cum idem
s i t . . . non mensuretur instanti, sed tempore" and section [33],
37. Silvia Donati and 1 are working on a set of (mostly anonymous) English
commentaries on the Physics dating back to 1250-1270, which we plan to edit over
the next few years. For the first results of our research, see Silvia Donati, "Per lo
studio dei comment! alia Fisica del XIII secolo, I: Commenti di probabile origine
inglese degli anni 1250-1270 ca. (parte I)," Documenti e studi suϊίa tradizione filosofica
medievak 2 (1991): 361-442; Trifogli, "Le question! sul libro III della Fisica in alcuni
commenti inglesi intorno alia meta del XIII secolo (parte I)," Documenti e studi suίla
tradizione filosofica medievak 2 (1991): 443-502.
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For the time being, it is possible, however, to assert that Wylton's
treatment of the limit decision problem is not isolated in the medieval
tradition, because it is closely associated with what is regarded as the
most popular work on this topic, namely, Walter Burley's treatise De
prίmo et ultimo instanti.3S A careful textual comparison has shown that
there are several passages which occur, almost in an identical form,
both in Wylton's question and in Burley's treatise-39 Since Wylton's
commentary on the Physics is likely to have been written before
Burley's De instanti^® then, provided that there is no third common




38. A detailed exposition of this work is given by Paola Feltrin and Massimo
Parodi, "II problema del primo e ultimo istante in Walter Burley," Medioevo 9 (1983):
137-178. See also Wilson, "William Heytesbury," pp. 32-33; Murdoch and Sylla,
"Science of Motion," pp. 242-243; Nielsen, "Thomas Bradwardine's Treatise," pp. 15-
17; Calvin G. Normore, "Walter Burley on Continuity," in Infinity and Continuity,
pp. 265-267.
39. Edith Sylla has first called my attention to the similarities between these texts.
She noticed that the passage of Burley's De instanti that I quote in the Appendix at
section [2.1] is found also in Wylton's question. See Edith Dudley Sylla, "Medieval
Concepts of the Latitude of Forms: The Oxford Calculators," AHDLMA 40 (1973):
223-283, at p. 234. In the Appendix, I give a more complete list of the passages
which are common to Wylton's question and Burley's De instanti.
40. Although neither of the two works have been dated with certainty, Burley's
treatise is a disputatio de quokbet held in Toulouse before 1320-1324 and after 1308-
1310, whereas Wylton's commentary on the Physics was probably written before 1304-
1305. On the dating of Burley's De instanti, see especially Agustίn Una Juarez, La
filosofίa del siglo XIV: Contexto cultural de Walter Burley (San Lorenzo de El Escorial:
Biblioteca "La Ciudad de Dios," 1978), pp. 25, 70-71, 77-78; Sylla, "Walter Burley's
Tractatus primus: Evidence Concerning the Relations of Disputations and Written
Works," Franciscan Studies 44 (1984): 257-274, at pp. 257-259, 261. Walter Burley is
also known to have incepted in Theology under Thomas Wylton. See, for instance,
Una Juarez, Fibsofίa del sigb XIV, pp. 22-25.
41.1 wish to thank Professor Stephen F. Brown for his suggestions in writing this
article and for his help in improving my English. I am also grateful to Dr. Concetta
Luna for her careful review of the critical edition of Wylton's question contained
in the appendix.
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains a critical edition of Thomas
Wylton's question "An contingit dare ultimum rei permanentis in
esse." This edition is based on the four manuscripts of Wylton's
Quaestίones libri Physicorum which are known at present:
C = Cesena, Biblioteca Malatestiana, MS. Plut VIII sin. 2, ff.
131rb-133rb (XlVth century)
E = Erfurt, Stadtbibliothek, MS. Ampl. Fol. 178, ff. 69vt>-70vb
(XlVth century)
M = Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, MS. 2015, ff. 204r-207v (XVth
century)
V = Citta del Vaticano, Biblioteca Vaticana, MS. Vat. Lat. 4709,
ff. 135rt^l37rb (XlVth-XVth century)
Since I am also preparing a complete critical edition of Wylton's
Quaestiones libri Physicorum^ I postpone both the description of the
manusripts and a full discussion of the textual tradition presented by
them until the publication of that work. Hence the present edition
aims at making available the content of Wylton's question rather than
at representing a final contribution to the edition of Wylton's Quaes-
tiones libri Physicorum. In this context, however, I shall summarize the
main results of the collation of the four manuscripts relative to 8.6.
The four seem to derive from a common source, which is distinct
from the archetype. This is suggested both by the occurrence of cases
where all four offer the same wrong reading (in [1.2], intrinsecus instead
of finitum; in [1.7.3], calidum instead of calidissimum; in [2.3], corruptum
instead of coπupta; in [2.4], the omission of in quo and est; in [3.1.2],
ipsum instead of ipsa) and by the occurrence of cases where none of
the four offers a correct reading (see, for instance, [2.4] and [3.1.1]).
C and E seem to form a couple, because the cases where they agree
against the other manusripts are comparatively frequent: they have
thirty-seven common variant readings, whereas M-V have eleven, E*
V have eleven, E-M have six, C-V have three, C-M have none. The
relationship between C and E is still unclear. It can be noted that
the text offered by E is more faulty than that offered by C, because
it presents several homoioteleuton omissions (eleven, whereas C has
only four).
No other definite grouping can at present be shown to exist among
the manusripts. It is very likely that M does not belong to the grouping
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C-E, because it has only five variant readings common to CΈ. On
the other hand, it cannot be established whether V belongs to the
grouping C Έ or it does not, and, in the latter case, whether it forms a
grouping with M or not, since V agrees with C-E against M in sixteen
cases, but also with M against C-E in eleven cases. Moreover, both M
and V have a great number of particular variant readings (i.e., variant
readings that appear in only one manuscript): M has 189, V has 174,
whereas C has 74 and E has 75.
Because of the lack of quality of the texts offered by M and V,
the present edition is mainly an attempt at a reconstruction of the
text offered by C-E. This means that in those cases where C-E offer a
variant reading which is equivalent to that offered by the others, the
variant reading of O E has been adopted (see, for instance, [Quaestio],
[1.5], [1.10], [2.4], [3.1.2]).
[THOMAS WYLTON QUAESTIONES
LίBRI PHYSICORUM 8.6]
Quaeritur an contingit dare ultimum rei permanentis in
esse in quo contingit dicere "nunc hoc est et postea non erit."
[1. ARGUMENTA PRO ET CONTRA]
Quod sic videtur:
[1.1] quia omne quod est in tempore quia in instanti, ita quod
non est in tempore nisi quia in instanti primo, si habeat esse finitum,
habet aliquod instans in quo est sibi correspondens postquam non
erit; forma permanens est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior probatur, quia
ex quo habet esse finitum habet aliquam mensuram in qua finitur suum
esse et per consequens in qua ultimatim est; cum ergo sua mensura
propria sit instans, erit ponere aliquod instans in quo ultimatim est.
Minor manifesta est, quia per hoc distinguitur esse permanens ab
esse successivo, quia permanens mensuratur instanti et successivum
tempore.
[1.2] Item, cuiuslibet finiti sunt duo termini intrinseci, aliter finitum
non esset in se finitum; sed esse durativum Sortis est quoddam finitum
in se; ergo habet duos terminos intrinsecos terminantes ipsum; ergo
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sicut est dare primum sui esse, ita et ultimum. Nee valet dicere quod
ultimum sui esse sit non esse, quoniam esse durativum, ex quo est
finitum in se, terminum intrinsecum habebit sibi, non esse autem
non est intrinsecum ipsi esse.
[L3] Item, si non est dare ultimum, haec consequentia est bona
"tu es; ergo tu eris," cum tamen haec consequentia non valeat. Con-
sequentia patet, quia si tu es modo et tui esse non est ultimum, ergo
habebis esse post hoc; et sic arguam de illo esse in infinitum. Ex quo
sequeretur quod semper eris. Quod tamen consequentia non valeat
"hoc est; ergo hoc erit" probatur, quia antecedens est determinate
verum, consequens autem, cum sit de futuro in materia contingenti,
est indeterminate verum.
[1.4] Praeterea, non currere mensuratur instanti et habet esse du-
rativum, sicut forma permanens in subiecto apto nato, et tamen con-
tingit dare ultimum non cursus. Nam in instanti in quo aliquis incipit
currere non est cursus et tune ultimo est non cursus; ergo contingit
dare ultimum rei permanentis.
[1.5] Item, VI huius1 Aristoteles arguit sic: si motus esset in instanti,
ergo in quolibet instanti et per consequens in ultimo. Sic arguo hie:
cum forma permanens nata est esse in instanti, ergo erit in quolibet
instanfi et sic per consequens in ultimo, vel ratio Philosophi ibi non
valebit.
[1.6] Item, per Philosophum,2 contingit dare primum instans in quo
aliquid est; contingit ergo vere dicere, quando ex aere fit ignis, quod
nunc primo est ignis. Sed sequitur: nunc primo est ignis; ergo imme-
diate ante hoc fuit non ignis, ut aer; sed esse aeris est mensuratum
instanti; ergo in aliquo instanti immediate ante hoc fuit aer et tune
ultimo, cum statim absque medio fit ignis.
[1.7.1] Item, pono quod aliquid quiescat sub gradu caliditatis per-
fectissimo per totum tempus a c et quod in termino indivisibili c
sit approximatum summe frigidum in ilia proportione in qua hoc
sit natum agere et illud pati. Certum est, retento opposito, in c
est calidissimum et numquam post c erit calidissimum. Quod sit ca-
lidissimum in c patet, quia in instanti non est actio. Quod non sit
post calidissimum probatio, quia, si sic, sequeretur quod agens esset
approximatum passo per tempus in quo natum est hoc agere et hoc pati
1. Aristotle Physics 6.3 (234a34-b5).
2. Aristotle Physics 8.8 (263b9-26).
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et etiam in proportione ilia in qua natum est hoc agere et hoc pati, et
tamen nee hoc ageret nee hoc pateretur, quod est impossibile. Quod
hoc sequatur patet, quia, si fπgidum ageret in illo tempore, cum sua
actio agat per contrarietatem remittendo caliditatem in passo, oportet
dare quod caliditas in passo remitteretur, vel si non, sed maneret sub
eodem gradu nunc et prius, sequeretur quod non mutaretur nee per
consequens ab alio pateretur.
[1.7-2] Huic rationi dicitur concedendo quod est dare ultimum
instans in quo aliquid dicitur calidissimum, tamen non contingit dare
ultimum instans in quo aliquid est calidum. Unde in formis abso-
lutis, quarum esse manere potest sub diversis gradibus perfectionis,
non contingit dare ultimum, tamen in formis talibus secundum quod
comprehendunt determinatum gradum perfectionis, cum talis gradus
in indivisibili consistit, ita quod quaecumque variatio modica variat
substantiam gradus et secundum nomen et secundum rationem, in
talibus bene contingit dare ultimum.
[1.7.3] Contra: primo probo quod non est dare ultimum in quo
est forma sub illo gradu. Nam per Philosophum in littera,3 omne
quod prius est non ens et postea est ens oportet aliquando quod fiat
ens. Aliam propositionem ponit4 similiter quod, cum aliquid fit, non
est. Ex his arguo: accipio illud instans quod tu dicis esse ultimum
in quo hoc est calidissimum. Si ergo fiat post non calidissimum,
hoc erit per aliquod fieri medium; sed certum est quod non fit non
calidissimum in instanti in quo est calidissimum. Nam fieri, cum sit
mutari, non est in instanti. Nee etiam fit non calid[issim]um quando
iam est non calid[issim]um; ergo in aliquo tempore medio fit non
calidissimum; sed quod fit non est; ergo in illo toto tempore medio non
est non calidissimum, et si hoc, per locum a contradictione sequitur:
ergo calidissimum est; ex quo sequitur quod ultimum datum non sit
ultimum. Et sicut arguitur de isto ultimo dato, sic argui potest de
quolibet ultimo in infinitum, et per consequens impossibile est dare
ultimum in quo est calidissimum.
[1.7.4] Item, probo quod eo ipso quod est dare ultimum alicuius talis
gradus quod est dare ultimum esse formae absolutae, puta ultimum in
quo aliquid est calidum. Nam per eandem rationem qua tu ponis
unum gradum secundum quern aliquid est calidissimum, qui gradus
3. Aristotle Physics 8.8 (263b26).
4. Aristotle Physics 8.8 (263b27).
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ita in indivisibili consistit quod, si aliquid perfectionis addatur, non
potest salvari natura caloris, ita contingit dare aliquem gradum ita
remissum caloris quod, si in aliquo ulterius remitteretur, variaretur
species calidi et fieret sub alia specie, puta tepidi. Arguo tune sic:
pono quod aliquid quiescat per tempus a c sub illo gradu caloris
maxime remisso et quod in instanti c occurrat ei corpus frίgidissimum.
Quaero an in illo instanti c ultimo sit sub illo gradu vel non. Si non,
sequeretur, ut prius argutum est,5 quod, agente approximato passo et
in debita proportione et in debita mensura, nee hoc agat nee illud
patiatur. Si detur quod sic, ergo in illo instanti est verum dicere quod
est ultimo calidum, quoniam simul desinit ille gradus caloris et species
caliditatis per positum, ex quo ille gradus est maxime remissus sub quo
natura calidi potest salvari, Et idem argumentum potest fieri de ίgne
et de aqua.
[1.8] Item, causa quare contingit dare primum in quo res facta est
et non ultimum, ut primum ignis et non ultimum aeris, videtur esse
quia corruptio formae prioris est inductio formae posterioris, et forma
posterior, cum inducta sit in instanti, tune est, forma autem prior,
cum corrupta sit in eodem instanti, tune non est. Et ideo, cum sit dare
primum instans in quo est forma sequens, non est dare ultimum esse
formae prioris. Ergo cum eadem sit causa in proposito—nam manente
caliditate in sua specie, non corrumpitur gradus nisi per inductionem
gradus contrarii vel incompossibilis—gradus ille, quicumque sit, in-
ductus est in instanti et in eodem instanti corrumpitur gradus primus;
ergo cum in illo instanti gradus posterior est, gradus autem prior non
est, sed corruptus est, videtur quod non contingit magis dare ultimum
in quo aliquis gradus caloris est quam sit dare ultimum in quo forma
caloris est.
[1.9] Aliae fiunt hie rationes multae, sed omnes positae sunt et
solutae prius, vel in IV, in quaestione de tempore mίnimo,6 vel in VI,
ubi quaerebatur an continuum successivum componatur ex indivis-
ibilibus.7
5. See [1.7.1].
6. In this question, however, the only reference to the limit decision problem is
the following: "Similiter rationes de ultimo rei permanentis in esse faciunt hie, de
quibus patebit in suo loco" (Thomas Wylton In Physicam 4.24, f. 73ra line 1 ab imo
to 73 r b line 1.
7. Thomas Wylton in Physicam 6.2, f. 99 rb lines 22-26.
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[1.10] Ad oppositum est Philosophus in littera.8
[2. DETERMINATE) QUAEST1ON1S]
[2.1] Ad quaestionem dicendum distinguendo quod per
rem permanentem contingit duo intelligere: vel formam positivam
aliquam cuius esse existit totum simul, vel non solum formam positi-
vam, sed indifferenter positivam vel privativam, dummodo eius esse
tale quale habet totum simul est, et isto modo non album potest
dici forma permanens. Et utrumque istorum membrorum est ulterius
distinguendum. Intelligendo enim per rem permanentem aliquam for-
mam positivam, adhuc hoc contingit dupliciter: vel enim ilia forma
habet latitudinem in gradibus, ita quod, corrupto uno gradu, potest
eadem forma manere sub alio, vel ilia forma importat perfectionem
aliquam secundum gradum punctualem.9 Exemplum primi: album,
calidum, ignis, aer, aqua. Omnia enim ista habent latitudinem in
gradibus et sub tota latitudine salvari possunt. Exemplum secundi: in
motu locali est hoc ubi signatum in quo est mobile in principio mo-
tus vel in medio; similiter, bicubitum, tricubitum in motu augmenti;
similiter, calidissimum, frigidissimum et omnes huiusmodi gradus in
motu alterationis.
[2.2] Loquendo de formis primo modo dictis, impossibile est dare
ultimum rei permanentis in esse in quo forma corrumpenda habeat
esse, et de talibus formis habet intelligi processus hie Philosophi;10
loquendo de formis secundo modo dictis, non.
[2.3] Ratio primi est ista: in talibus formis, cum non corrumpantur
nisi per motum vel per mutationem, tota mutatio continua cadit super
formam priorem cuius mutationis continuae terminus est corruptum
esse illius formae. Et quia in eodem instanti forma aliqua corrupta
est et forma contraria inducta est, sequitur, ut dicit Philosophus,11 si
aliquis daret ultimum in quo esset forma prior, cum idem sit instans
mensurans ultimum prioris formae et principium posterioris, aliter non
esset tempus continuum, necesse esset concedere quod vel aliquid,
8. Aristotle Physics 8.8 (263b9-26).
9. On Wylton's theory of the latitude of forms, see especially Thomas Wylton, In
Physicam 5.7 "Utrum ad qualitatem sit motus," f. 84 v b line 1 to 87 r b line 7 άb imo.
10. Aristotle Physics 8.8 (263b9-264al).
11. Aristotle Physics 8.8 (263b9-26).
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quando factum est, non esset, et cum corruptum est, esset, aut quod
simul aliquid esset et non esset, quorum utrumque est impossibile.
Tota autem causa huius est quia in transmutatione talis formae mu-
tatio continua cadit super formam priorem, quae mutatio terminatur
ad mutatum esse illius formae, quod est eius corruptum esse, et ad
inductum esse formae contrariae, et per consequens forma prior in illo
instanti non est, cum corrupta sit. Et ideo necesse est dicere in talibus
quod in illo instanti ultimo res denominetur a posteriori passione, ut
dicit Philosophus.12
[2.4] Ratio secundi est ista, quia tales perfectiones in indivisibili
consistunt, ita quod, sicut in numeris, quocumque abstracto vel amoto,
variatur tota substantia illius perfectionis, ideo nulla mutatio continua
potest cadere super talem gradum vel talem perfectionem formae,
manente gradu eodem quo prius, et ideo tota continuitas cadit in
talibus supra non esse talium, et hoc sive non esse praecedat esse
sive econtra. Unde si ex non calidissimo fiat calidissimum vel ex non
bicubito bicubitum vel ex non hoc ubi in hoc ubi, non contingit dare
ultimum alicuius non esse, sed primum esse. Si autem fiat mutatio
econtra ex calidissimo in non calidissimum vel ex bicubito in non
bicubitum et sic de aliis, contingit dare ultimum quietis sub calidissimo
et similiter sub bicubito, sed non contingit dare primum non esse
alicuius talis. Causa quare contingit dare ultimum quietis est quia res,
dum quiescit, eodem modo se habet nunc et prius in omni signo, et per
consequens in termino quietis, cum idem sit terminus quietis et prin-
cipium motus, adhuc—certum est—non mutatur; et si hoc, sequitur
quod, si prius fuit calidissimum, adhuc est calidissimum. Causa autem
quare non contingit dare primum [in quo] non est calidissimum [est]
quia ab illo instanti quod est finis quietis sub gradu priori patitur per
motum contrarii agentis ipsum calidissimum, ratione cuius continue
aliter et aliter se habet, et ideo sicut non contingit dare primam
partem in motu nee etiam primum mutatum esse, sic non contingit
dare primum non esse illius gradus vel primum inductum esse gradus
incompossibilis. Et ideo quia in talibus formis non est dare primum
non esse, ideo non est mirum etsi sit dandum ultimum esse.
[2.5] De secundo membro, si per rem permanentem non solum
intelligat formas positivas, sed negationes talium formarum, distin-
guo: vel illae negationes sunt negationes formarum permanentium vel
12. Aristotle Physics 8.8 (263b9-12).
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successivarum. Si successivarum, semper contingit dare ultimum. Et
causa est quia non est dare primum alicuius successivi, puta in motu
nee primum mutatum esse nee primam partem. Et ideo, cum idem sit
terminus quietis et principium motus, in illo termino quietis verum erit
dicere "nunc mobile ultimo non movetur." Nee valet instare per hoc
quod pro tanto tune ultimo non movetur, quia in instantibus sequent
tibus adhuc etiam non movetur, cum in instanti non sit motus, quia,
sicut dictum est in prima quaestione IV huius,13 in quolibet instanti
continuante partes motus et temporis verum est dicere quod mobile
movetur, ita quod veritas propositionis seu compositionis praedicati
ad subiectum instanti mensuratur, quamvis ipsum praedicatum non
mensuretur instanti, sed tempore. Si loquamur de negatione formae
permanentis, adhuc distinguendum est. Vel enim est negatio formae
habentis latitudinem in gradibus vel est negatio alicuius perfectionis
indivisibilis. Si primo modo, numquam contingit dare ultimum non
esse alicuius formae, tamen bene contingit dare primum non esse.
Loquendo de non esse secundo modo, numquam contingit dare nee
ultimum non esse nee primum non esse. Et causa est quia talis gradus
contingit dare primum sui esse et etiam ultimum sui esse, et per
consequens, eo quod est dare primum esse talis gradus, non est dare
ultimum non esse. Similiter, eo quod est dare ultimum sui esse, non
est dare primum sui non esse.
[3. RESPONS1O AD ARGUMENTA]
[3.1] His intellects ad rationes: Ad primam14 dicendum
primo ad maiorem, postea ad minorem.
[3.1.1] Ad maiorem, quod ipsa falsa est. Et ad probationem, quando
accipitur quod ex quo eius esse est finitum, si non sit ultimum instans
in quo est, oportet dare aliquam aliam mensuram in qua ultimatim
foret, dico quod non sequitur, quia ultimum sui esse, cum sit ultimum
sui mutationis per quam transmutatur in formam contrariam, est eius
corruptum esse, et ideo in eius ultimo sibi nullum esse debetur nee
per consequens mensura mensurans suum esse.
13. Thomas Wylton in Physicam 4-1 "Utrum tempus sit," f. 61 rb line 2 ab imo
to 61va line 24.
14. See [1.1].
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[3.1.2] Similiter, minor patitur calumniam. Cum dicitur quod forma
permanens mensuratur instanti tanquam propria mensura, quaero an
intelligit per instans instans secundum esse vel instans secundum
substantiam.15 Si primo modo, propositio falsa est. Instans enim se-
cundum esse est propria mensura mutati esse in motu. Unde etsi
res permanens mensuretur instanti secundum esse, hoc non est in
quantum permanens, sed in quantum est sub aliquo mutato esse cor-
respondente mutato esse in potentia in primo motu. Accipiendo ergo
sic formam permanentem ut sub motu, bene concedo quod contingit
dare ultimum instans in quo est sub ultimo mutato esse eius, quod
est eius corruptum esse, sed in illo instanti ultimo forma permanens
non est, cum corrupta sit. Si intelligat per instans instans secundum
substantiam, sic potest concedi minor, quoniam ad formam permanen-
tem proprie loquendo duae requiruntur condiciones: una quod nata sit
habere esse continuum per quod distinguitur ab his quae raptim transe-
unt, cuiusmodi sunt mutata esse in motu et indivisibilia in tempore;
alia condicio est quod ipsa secundum substantiam totum esse habeat
simul in uno instanti quod habet in toto esse suo continuo, ita quod
esse substantiale maneat, varietur tamen secundum esse accidentale.
Tale autem est esse instantis secundum substantiam. Est enim instans
et manens per totum tempus, habens tamen totum suum esse simul,
invariabile etiam secundum substantiam, variabile secundum esse acci-
dentale. Si ergo intelligat in minori quod forma permanens mensuratur
instanti secundum substantiam, concedo. Et quando ulterius arguitur
"ergo est dare aliquod instans in quo est postquam non est," dico quod
non est dare instans secundum substantiam nisi tantum unum in toto
tempore, et loquendo de illo instanti concedo quod in illo instanti
ultimo est et non erit postea, quia nihil erit post illud instans, cum
sit aeternum.
[3.2] Ad aliud16 dicendum concedendo, cum esse durativum huius
formae sit finitum, quod eius erit dare ultimum. Unde concedo quod
est dare ultimum sui esse et hoc est suum corruptum esse, sed non
est dare suum ultimum esse, hoc est in quo verum sit dicere ipsum
ultimo esse. Unde breviter non habet alium terminum ultimum nisi
15. On Wylton's treatment of the distinction between these two kinds of instants,
see his In Physicam 4.22 "Utrum instans maneat unum et idem in toto tempore," f.
68ra line 11 to f. 69ra line 4 ab imo.
16. See [1.2].
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suum non esse- Et quando arguitur quod non esse non potest esse
terminus intrinsecus ipsius esse, dicendum quod non esse potest intel^
ligi dupliciter: vel absolute, et sic esse et non esse, cum contradicant,
neutrum est terminus alterius. Similiter, ut sic non includunt aliquam
continuitatem nee per consequens aliquem terminum habent. Alio
modo potest esse intelligi ut stat sub mutatione continua per quam
tendit ad non esse, et ut sic est eius terminus non esse nee alium
terminum intrinsecum habet in actu. Nee prohibet hoc quod non esse
non est eiusdem rationis cum esse, quia hoc non requiritur in muta-
tionibus, sicut patet in generatione quae comprehendit alterationem
praecedentem. Continuitas enim ibi attenditur penes qualitates for'
mae corrumpendae, terminus tamen illius mutationis est substantia-
t e est dare ibi aliquem terminum ipsius alterationis circa formam
accidentalem, et sic nee hic-
[3-3] Ad aliud17 dicendum quod bene sequitur "hoc est; ergo hoc
erit," Intelligendo consequens ut hoc verbum "erit" copulat vage non
pro aliquo supposito futuri signato, concedo quod, si hoc est, ergo
hoc erit per infinita instantia quorum quodlibet sequitur aliud secun^
dum divisionem temporis in partes eiusdem proportionis, non eius-
dem quantitatis- Nee sequitur "erit per infinita instantia; ergo semper
erit," sed est fallacia consequentis, quoniam antecedens est verum
de minima parte temporis. In minima enim parte temporis quae sig-
nari potest sunt infinita instantia quorum quodlibet est post aliud,
sed "semper" distribuit pro omni parte temporis potentiali et actu-
ali. Ulterius, quando accipitur quod consequens est indeterminate
verum, dicendum quod est determinate verum, supposito antecedente.
Unde licet "hoc erit" de forma sua non sit determinate verum—nam
demonstrato supposito futuro, ut Antichristus, non est determinate
verum—supposito tamen quod hoc sit in hoc nunc, consequens est
determinate verum- Unde per accidens est quod talis propositio de
futuro sit determinate vera.
[3.4] Ad aliud18 patet in positioned9





21. See Thomas Wylton in Physicam 6.7, f. 102va lines 10-6 ab imo\ f. 102vb lines
16-3 ab imo.
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[3.6] Ad aliud22 dicendum quod non sequitur "nunc primo est ignis;
ergo immediate ante fuit non ignis," quia nulla mensura fuit immediate
ante. Nam, ut dictum est,23 signato aliquo indivisibili, nihil est dare
immediatum sibi nee divisibile nee indivisibile, et si hoc, nihil est
dare immediatum ante nee immediatum post.
[3.7] Ad aliud2^ dicendum ut dicebatur.25
[3.7.1] Ad primum in contrarium26 dicendum quod Philosophus
non vult dicere quod inter non esse, ut est quoddam continuum
terminatum per esse, et esse cadat fieri medium, sed intelligit quod
inter quodcumque instans signatum in quo est sub non esse et instans
signatum in quo est sub esse cadit fieri medium. Sic concedo hie
quod inter hoc instans in quo ultimo est calidissimum et quodcumque
instans signatum in quo est non calidissimum cadit fieri medium. Et
concedo quod in illo medio mobile non est non calidissimum illo
gradu caliditatis inter quern et calidissimum mediat ipsum fieri, est
tamen sub alio gradu non caliditatis in potentia, nee est dare primum
gradum in quo est non calid[issim]um.
[3.7.2] Ad aliud27 dicendum quod calidum, frigidum et huiusmodi
qualitates habent diversos gradus secundum hoc quod consequuntur
diversa corpora naturalia. Alius est calor et alios terminos habens
prout consequitur formam aeris et formam ignis. Ergo si ratio habeat
difficultatem per hoc quod ponit remiss[issim]um gradum vel perfec-
tissimum, hoc erit circa aliquod corpus naturale, puta circa ignem
vel aerem vel aliquid tale. Et tune dico quod impossibile est quod
quiescat sub remississimo gradu vel perfectissimo. Nam, cum omnia
talia corpora sint activa et passiva ad invicem, sicut non contingit dare
ultimum esse talis formae in quo talis forma est, ita non contingit dare
ultimum gradum caliditatis in quo caliditas ultimo est, sed sicut ter-
minatur esse prioris formae ad inductum esse formae sequentis et non
ad aliquod esse ultimum intrinsecum, ita nee remissio in qualitatibus
vel etiam intensio. Supposito quod aliquid posset intendere calorem
igneum ultra proportionem suae formae, non contingit dare aliquod
ultimum in quo est sub caliditate ignea.
22. See [1.6].






[3.7.3] Dicetur: istud videtur contra praedicta. Concessum enim est
prius28 quod ignis possit quiescere sub gradu calidissimo.
[3.7.4] Dicendum quod iste gradus, scilicet calidissimus, vel potest
comparari ad ignem relictum propriae naturae non admixtum con-
trario nee passum a contrario agente, sicut est de igne in medio
sphaerae suae, et sic ignis bene potest quiescere sub illo gradu et
quantum est ex se ilium gradum sibi determinat. Similiter etiam potest
ignis quiescere sub multis gradibus remissioribus, tamen nee sub gradu
remississimo nee intensissimo quern potest habere a contrario agente
potest quiescere; immo, cum aqua sit naturaliter frigida et aer calidus,
nihil prohibet aquam passam esse calidiorem aere.
[3.8.1] Ad ultimam rationem29 dicendum quod non est eadem
causa. Nam in formis habentibus latitudinem secundum gradus muta-
tio continua se tenet ex parte formae corrumpendae et terminatur ad
formam inducendam tanquam ad terminum in actu. Unde in motu,
quamvis non sit dare primum mutatum esse in potentia, contingit
tamen dare primum mutatum esse in actu; sed in corruptione gradus
indivisibilis mutatio continua se tenet ex parte negationis. Nam ille
gradus manens idem non mutatur, sed quaecumque variatio ex parte
gradus, ut dictum est, tollit ilium gradum, et ideo corruptio illius gradus
non est per aliquid incompossibile actu inductum quod sit primus
terminus illius mutationis in quo est sub non calidissimo, sicut ex
alia parte inductum esse ignis est primum in quo est non aer, sed
ante quemcumque gradum est gradus in infinitum, propter quod non
est simile.
[3.8.2] Adhuc posset aliquis dicere ex quo, ut dictum est, quod
non est dare ultimum esse formae permanentis, mirabile videtur quod
Philosophus30 universaliter et absque distinctione determinat quod
non est dare ultimum, sed primum.
[3.8.3] Dicendum quod Philosophus nee illam quaestionem mo vet
nee eam solvit, sed solum respondet uni obiectioni quae solebat fieri
in generabilibus et corruptibilibus, scilicet in igne et aere et talibus
formis, ubi corruptio unius terminatur ad generationem esse alterius,
sicut mutatio continua ad suum terminum, et in talibus, ut dictum
28. See [2.4].
29. See [1.8].
30. Aristotle Physics 8.8 (263b9-12).
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est, est universaliter verum quod non est dare ultimum non esse vel
esse prioris passionis, cum sit dare primum posterioris.
VARIANT READINGS
The variants given here are keyed to phrases within
sections of the text edited above- Only trivial variants have been
left out (e.g., ergo / igitur). The orthography has been normalized
according to classical standards.
[Quaestio]
Quaeritur om. EV
an I utrum V
contingit dare I contingat dare V
contingit dicere I contingat dicere V
nunc hoc inυ. MV
hoc est I hoc esse V
non erit I non esse V
[1.1]
in tempore quia I est quod M
in instanti ita I instanti ita C, in instanti est ita M
in instanti primo I instanti primo C, in instanti prius E
esse finitum | esse infinitum CE
in quo est sibi I in quo enim sibi V
ex quo habet esse finitum habet aliquam mensuram I ex quo
finitum habere mensuram E
qua ultimatim est I qua ultimatum est C, qua ultimate M, qua
ultimatum E
sua mensura inυ. V
quo ultimatim I quo ultimatum CE, quo ultimate M
quia per hoc I per hoc quod V
ab esse successivo I ad esse successivum CE, a successivo V
quia permanens I quod permanens C
mensuratur instanti et I mensuratur in instanti et E, mensuratur
in instanti V
tempore I tempori V
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[1.2]
Item, cuiuslibet I Item cuilibet C
finiti sunt duo termini intrinseci I ήniti sunt termini intrinsecus E
aliter finitum I scrips^ aliter intrinsecus CEMV
sed esse durativum Sortis I sed esset durativum Sortes V
est quoddam ήnitum | esse quoddam finitum M
ergo habet duos terminos I habet igitur duos terminos E
terminos intrinsecos terminantes I terminos sibi determinantes
intrinsecos (sed coπ. in intrinsecos determinantes) M
ita et ultimum I et ultimum M, ita ultimum E
quoniam esse durativum I quoniam est durativum V, quoniam esse
duratum C
ex quo est finitum I ex quo est infinitum E
habebit sibi, non esse autem I habebit sui non esse aliter M
non est intrinsecum ipsi I non esset intrinsecum ipsi M
[13]
tu eris I eris E
haec consequentia I consequentia V
et tui I tui V
ergo habebis esse | ergo habebit esse M
in infinitum I infinitum CE
semper eris I semper erit M
Quod tamen consequentia I Quod autem haec consequentia M,
Quod consequentia tamen V
quia antecedens I quia accidens C
determinate verum I determinatum verum V
futuro in materia I futuro M
[1.4]
currere mensuratur I currere in (interl) M, currere mensuratur in
V
Nam in instanti I Nam instanti C
in quo aliquis I in quo aliquid CEV
et tune ultimo est non cursus om. horn, E
ergo contingit dare I ergo contingit M
[1.5]
Aristoteles I Philosophus M
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esset in instanti | esset ins tant i C
ergo in quolibet | igitur erit in quolibet V
arguo hie I arguo V
c u m forma p e r m a n e n s I forma p e r m a n e n s M
esse in instanti I esse instant i C
ergo erit in I ergo est in V
et sic per I et per V
[1.6]
contingit dare p r i m u m I cont ingi t p r i m u m C E
in quo aliquid est I in q u o M, in quo aliquid C E
contingi t ergo vere I c o n t i n u u m ergo vere V, cont ingi t verum M,
ergo contingit ve rum E
q u a n d o ex aere I c u m quod ex aere V
quod n u n c pr imo • . • h o c fuit n o n ignis iter. horn. V
ignis, ut a e r . • • a n t e h o c fuit om. horn. C E
ignis, ut aer I ignis vel aer M
est mensuratum instant i I est m e n s u r a t u m in instanti V
aliquo instanti immedia te I aliquo instant i in quo aliquis quiescit
mediate set. et cσrr. M
et tune ultimo I et tune ulterius M
[1.7.1]
pono quod aliquid I pono quod aliquis EM
quiescat sub gradu caliditatis I quiescat sub gradu caloris M
tempus a c et I tempus et V
et quod in termino I et in termino E, et quod in toto M
in ilia proportione I in ista proportione M
et illud pati I et pati C
retento opposito I forte pro: isto casu posito (cfr. Texts from Burley
ad bc.)» retento posito M
in c est calidissimum I in c calidissimum V
post c erit calidissimum I post c est calidissimum M
Quod sit calidissimum I postquam sit calidissimum M
in c patet I c ibi patet V
quia in instanti | quia instanti C
post calidissimum probatio I calidissimum probo M, post calidum
probatio V
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et etiam in proportione ilia I et in proportione ista M, et etiam in
ilia proportione E
agere et hoc om. horn. CEM
nee hoc pateretur I nee pateretur hoc E
Quod hoc sequatur patet I Quod autem hoc sequatur M
ageret in illo tempore I ageret in isto tempore M
cum sua actio agat I cum agens agat M, cum sua agat C
[1.7.2]
dicitur concedendo quod I dicitur concedo quod M
quo aliquid dicitur calidissimum I quo aliquid dividitur calidissi-
mum C, quo aliquid calidissimum dicitur V
in quo aliquid est I in quo, in quo aliquid est est M
Unde in formis absolutis I in formis absolutis E, Unde in formis
absolute V
I 1-
quarum esse manere I quarum est manere b
determinatum gradum perfectionis I gradum perfectionis determi-
natum M
gradus in indivisibili I gradus indivisibilis V
[1.7.3]
probo quod non est I probo quod non contingit M
forma sub illo gradu I forma sub gradu isto M
aliquando quod fiat ens I quod aliquando fiat ens M
Aliam propositionem ponit I similem propositionem ponit M, ad
propositum ponit V
cum aliquid fit I cum aliquid sit C
accipio illud instans I accipiendo illud instans E
post non calidissimum I primo non calidissimum V
hoc erit per aliquod I hoc est per aliquod V
quod non fit non I non (2) interl. M
in instanti in quo est calidissimum I instanti in quo est calidum
C, in instanti in quo est calidum E
non est in instanti I non fit in instanti V, non est instanti CE
nee etiam fit I nee etiam sit C
quando iam est non calid[issim]um I om. horn. M, quanto iam est
calidum CE, quanto iam est non calidum V
medio fit non calidissimum I medio fit non calidum M, medio fit
nunc calidissimum C
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est ergo in illo toto I ergo est in illo toto CE, ergo est in toto isto
M
non est non calidissimum I non est calidissimum E, non est non
calidum V
et si hoc I et sic hoc M
ergo calidissimum est I ergo est calidum M, ergo calidissimum CE
sicut arguitur de isto I sic arguit de isto V
sic argui potest I sicut argui potest V
de quolibet ultimo in I de quibusdam ultimo C, de quocumque
dato in M
dare ultimum in quo est I dare ultimum (ίnterl.) in quo est M
in quo est calidissimum • . • gradus quod est dare ultimum om. horn.
E
in quo est calidissimum I in quo est calidum M
[1.7.4]
Item, probo I cσrr. in Item probem (?) V
esse formae absolutae I formae absolutae E, esse formale absolutae
V
non potest salvari natura I non potest salvare natura V
caloris ita contingit dare aliquem gradum I ita contingit dare
aliquem gradum caloris M
ita remissum caloris quod I ita remissum caloris qui C
variaretur species calidi I varietur species calidi EV, varietur species
calida C
tempus a c sub illo I tempus a c sub isto M
quod in instanti c I in instanti c M, quod instanti c C
occurrat ei corpus frigidissimum I occurrat ei corpus frigidum M
an in illo instanti c I an illo instanti c V, an in isto instanti c M
sub illo gradu vel I sub gradu illo vel E
Si non, sequeretur I Si non sequetur CE
ut prius argutum est I ut prius dictum est M
agente approximato passo I agente approximata passo C
nee hoc agat nee I natura hoc agat nee C
quod est ultimo calidum I quod ultimo calidum est M, quod est
ultimum calidum V
desinit ille her. V
species caliditatis per positum I species caliditatis proportionatum
C
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ex quo ille gradus I ex quo ipse gradus M
potest salvari iter. M
[1.8]
in quo res facta est I in quo res est facta M
ut primum ignis I et primum ignis V
inducta sit in instanti I inducta sit instanti C
sit in eodem instanti I sit in instanti eodem M
Et ideo, cum I non add. interl M
sit dare primum instans I sit dare ultimum instans M, sit dare
ultimum earn (?) CE
nam manente caliditate I non manente caliditate V
gradus contrarii vel I impossibilis add. sed exp. C
vel incompossibilis—gradus ille I vel impossibilis gradus iste M
est in instanti I est eodem instanti C
cum in illo instanti I cum illo instanti MV, cum in eodem instanti
E
gradus posterior est I gradus posterioris est C
gradus autem prior non est I gradus autem prioris non est V
contingit magis dare ultimum I contingit dare ultimum magis M
in quo aliquis gradus caloris I in quo aliquid gradus caloris V
in quo forma caloris est I in forma caloris M
[1.9]
Aliae fiunt I Aliae sunt M
in IV, in quaestione I in quarta quaestione V
quaestione de tempore minimo I quo determinatur de numero M
an continuum successivum | an continuum susceptivum b
[1.10]
Philosophus in littera I Philosophus in textu M
[2.1]
dicendum distinguendo quod I dicendum quod V, dicendum dis-
tinguendo CE
formam positivam aliquam | formam positam aliquam C, formam
positivam alicuius M
cuius esse existit I esse cuius existit C, esse cuius consistit V, cuius
esse consistit M
formam positivam, sed indifferenter positivam I formam positam
sed indifferenter positam C
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dummodo eius esse tale I dummodo esse eius tale E
membrorum est ulterius distinguendum I membrorum est ultimo
distinguendum M, membroum est ulterius distinctum V
Intelligendo enim per rem | Intelligo enim per rem V
permanentem aliquam formam positivam I permanentem aliquam
formam positam C
adhuc hoc contingit dupliciter I adhuc contingit dupliciter E,
adhuc hoc hoc contingit dupliciter M, adhuc hoc contigit dare
dupliciter V
vel enim ilia forma I vel enim ista forma M
potest eadem forma manere I potest eadem forma remanere E
sub alio, vel ilia I sub alia vel ilia CEV, sub alio vel ista M
Exemplum primi: album, calidum I Exemplum primi: calidum V
Omnia enim ista habent I Omnia ista habent V
latitudine salvari possunt I latitudine salvari possunt- Intelligent
dum tamen quod est dare ultimum esse non quando aliquod
mobile manens cedit ab aliquo vel signata, tamen supposito quod
aliquid corrumpatur in aliquo signato non contingit dare magis
ultimum esse ubi quam ultimum esse divisibile V
similiter, bicubitum, tricubitum I similiter bicubitum et tricubitum
V
similiter, calidissimum, frigidissimum I similiter calidum et frigidum
V
[2.2]
Loquendo de formis I Loquendo de primis formis V
primo modo dictis I primo dictis E
in quo forma corrumpenda I in quo forma corrupta M, in quo
forma corrumpatur et V
et de talibus formis I de talibus formis V
habet intelligi processus I habet intelligi huius processus E
hie Philosophi | hie phisice V
secundo modo dictis, non | secundo modo dictis EV
[2.3]
tota mutatio continua I tota autem mutatio continua CEV
corruptum esse illius formae I corruptum esse istius formae M
Et quia in eodem instanti I Quia in eodem instanti E, Et quia in
eodem in instanti M
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forma aliqua corrupta I forma alia corrupta C, forma autem cor-
rupta V
contraria inducta est I est om. CE, interl. M
in quo esset forma prior I in quo est forma prior E
et principium posterioris I et ultimum posterioris CEV
aliter non esset tempus I aliter non est tempus V
concedere quod vel aliquid I concedere quod nihil aliquid CM,
concedere quod nihil aliud V
quando factum est I quando factum E, quando positum V, est interl.
C
cum corruptum est I cum corruptum V
esse illius formae I esse istius formae M
quod est eius corruptum I quae est eίus corruptum V
cum corrupta sit I scripsiy cum corruptum sit CEMV
necesse est dicere in talibus I necesse est dicere talibus E
[2.4]
quia tales perfectiones I quod tales perfectiones M
sicut in numeris I sicut numerus EV
quocumque abstracto vel amoto I quocumque substracto vel amoto
M, quocumque abstracto vel remoto V
nulla mutatio continua I nulla mutatio V
potest cadere super talem gradum I potest esse super talem gradum
E, potest cadere supra talem gradum V
manente gradu eodem I manente eodem gradu M
non esse talium I non esse talium graduum MV
et hoc sive non I sive non M
sive econtra I vel econtra V
si ex non calidissimo I si non ex calidissimo CE
ex non bicubito bicubitum I non ex bicubito bicubitum CE, ex
bicubito bicubitum V
vel ex non hoc ubi I vel non hoc ubi M
esse sed primum esse I scripsiy esse nisi primum esse CE, esse nisi
ipsum esse M, esse non primum esse V
econtra ex calidissimo in | in interl V
sub calidissimo et similiter. . • contingit dare ultimum quietis I
om. horn. E
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dare primum non esse I sicus add. sed exp. C
Causa quare contingit dare I Causa autem quare contingit dare M
ultimum quietis est quia I ultimum quietis quia V
dum quiescit, eodem modo I dum quiescit eo modo E, quae dicitur
quiescere eodem modo M
cum idem sit terminus quietis I om. horn. V
et principium motus, adhuc I et primum motus adhuc C
non est calidissimum I non esse talis M, non calidissimum V
sub gradu priori I sub gradu posteriori C, sub gradu particulari (?)
E
sic non contingit dare I sic nee contingit dare C
primum non esse illius gradus I non esse illius gradus V, non esse
istius M
esse gradus incompossibilis I esse gradus impossibilis E
non est dare primum I non est dare V
dare primum non esse ideo I dare primum non esse et ideo M
non est mirum etsi I vero est mirum etsi h
sit dandum ultimum esse I sit dandum ultimum non esse CEV
[2.5]
De secundo membro, si I De secundo membro scilicet M
non solum intelligat I non solum intelligas M
talium formarum, distinguo I est distinguendum V
distinguo: vel illae negationes sunt negationes formarum I om.
horn. E
vel illae negationes sunt I vel istae negationes sunt M, vel illae
negationes talium sunt V
et principium motus I et principium motus et V
in illo termino quietis I in isto termino quietis M
verum erit dicere "nunc I verum est dicere nunc EV, verum erit
dicere non M
Nee valet I Si etiam vellet V, Nee M, in add. sed exp. C
valet instare | valet instatur M
adhuc etiam non movetur I adhuc autem motus non movetur E
non movetur, cum in | in om. C, interl. M
dictum est in prima I dictum est in primo E, dictum est in potentia
V
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quaestione IV I IV quaestione CE
quolibet instanti continuante I quolibet instanti V
praedicatum non mensuretur I in add. V
instanti sed tempore I instanti sed in tempore M
Si loquamur I scilicet loquamur C, Si loquatur M
adhuc distinguendum est I adhuc est distinguendum M, adhuc
distinguendum CE
negatio formae habentis I negatio conformae habentis C
alicuius perfectionis indivisibilis I alicuius indivisibilis perfectionis
ίnv. M
numquam contingit dare I numquam attingit dare C
dare primum non esse I dare non esse primum M
non esse. Loquendo • • • gradus contingit dare primum ίter. horn. C
bene contingit dare primum non esse I secundo modo numquam
contingit dare nee ultimum non esse nee principium esse et causa
est quia talis gradus contingit dare primum non esse add. E
Et causa est quia I contingit dare primum non esse. Loquendo
de non esse secundo numquam contingit dare nee ultimum non
esse nee primum non esse, quia contingit dare primum non esse.
Loquendo de non esse secundo modo numquam contingit dare
nee ultimum non esse nee primum non esse et causa est quia
add. iter.V
contingit dare primum sui. . . primum esse talis gradus om. horn. E
sui esse et etiam | esse sui et etiam V, sui esse et per consequens
M
ultimum sui esse I ultimum sui non esse V
eo quod est dare I quod est dare C
Similiter, eo quod est dare I Similiter dico quod est dare M
[3.1]
His intellects ad rationes I His igitur intellects respondetur ad
rationes et primo M
Ad primam dicendum primo I Ad primam dicendum M
postea ad minorem. Ad maiorem om. horn. M
[3.1.1]
quod ipsa falsa est I quod falsa est M, quod ipsa est falsa V
oportet dare aliquam aliam I oportet dare aliquam V
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aliquam aliam mensuram I in qua sit in instanti add. E, in qua sit
instanti add. C, in qua sit quam in instanti add. MV
in qua ultimatim | in qua ultimate M
ultimum sui mutationis I ultimum mutationis V, ultimum suae
mutationis M, ultimum sui transmutationis E
per quam transmutatur I per quam transit M
ultimo sibi nullum esse I ultimo non esse sibi M, ultimo super (?)
nullum esse E, ultimo sibi unum esse C
[3.1.2]
forma permanens mensuratur I in add. EV
quaero an intelligit I quaero an intelligat M
instans instans I instans CEV
propositio falsa est I propositio est falsa MV
Instans enim secundum esse I Instans enim secundum CE
est propria mensura mutati • . . instanti secundum esse iter. horn. C
est propria mensura mutati I est propria mensura mutatum V
etsi res permanens mensuretur I etsi res permanens mutetur V
Accipiendo ergo sic formam permanentem ut sub motu I Accip-
iendo ergo sic forma permanentem ut sub motu C, Accipiendo
ergo sic forma permanente ut sub motu E, ut sic add. M
quod est eius corruptum | quod eius est corruptum C, quod est
corruptum E
sed in illo instanti I sed in isto instanti ME
Si intelligat per I Si vero intelligat per M
instans secundum substantiam I instans secundum aliam C
potest concedi minor I potest concedi maior V
ad formam permanentem proprie I ad formam manentem proprie
M
una quod nata I una quae nata CE
sit habere esse continuum I sit habere continuum esse E
raptim transeunt I sive moventur add. M
motu et indivisibilia I motu indivisibilia EM
alia condicio est I alia condicio CE
quod ipsa secundum I scripsi, quod ipsum secundum CEMV
in toto esse suo I in termino suo E, in toto suo CV
quod esse substantiale maneat I quod esse substantiae medietas V
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secundum esse accidentale I secundum esse actuale M
esse instantis secundum substantiam I esse instans secundum sub-
stantiam V
Est enim instans I Est enim stans V
simul, invariabile I et add. M, simul et variabile E
etiam secundum substantiam variabile om. horn. V
secundum esse accidentale I secundum esse accidentalia C
Si ergo intelligat I Si ergo intelligant V
in minori quod forma I in minore quod forma C
forma permanens mensuratur I forma permanens mensurati V
Et quando I Et quod C
ulterius arguitur I ulterius accipitur E
est postquam non est I erit post quod non est M, erit postquam
non est E
unum in toto tempore I unum in tempore V
loquendo de illo instanti I loquendo de isto instanti M
concedo quod in illo I concedo quo illo V, concedo quod in isto
M
instanti ultimo est I instanti ultimo E
quia nihil erit I quod nihil erit C
post illud instans I per illud instans V
[3.2]
cum esse durativum I tamen esse durativum V
huius formae sit finitum I huius formae sic ftnitum V
quod eius erit dare I quod eius est dare MV
esse et hoc est suum I et hoc est suum V
sed non est dare I sed non est MV
dare suum ultimum esse I dare sic ultimum esse M
breviter non habet alium I breviter non habet nullum M
dicendum quod non esse potest I dicendum quod esse potest M
non esse potest intelligi dupliciter I non esse potest sumi dupliciter
M
et sic esse et non esse I et sic non esse et esse M
includunt aliquam continuitatem | includunt aliam incontinui-
tatem C, includunt aliquam incontinuitatem E, includunt ali-
quam contrarietatem M
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aliquem terminum habent I alium terminum habent M, aliquem
terminum habet CE, alium terminum habet V
Alio modo potest • . • tendit ad non esse transp. 3.3 M
potest esse intelligi I potest intelligi E, potest intelligi esse V
ut stat sub mutatione I ut stant sub mutatione V
non esse non est I non esse est CEV
quia hoc non requiπtur I quia cum non requiπtur b
patet in generatione I patet in genere V
Continuitas enim ibi I Continuans enim ibi V, Continuitas enim
E
corrumpendae, terminus tamen I correspondents terminus cum C,
corruptae tamen cum termino V
terminus tamen illius I tamen terminus illius E, terminus tamen
istius M
illius mutationis est I illius mutationis in CV
Nee est dare I non est dare CEV
ibi aliquem terminum I ibi alium terminum V
alterationis circa formam accidentalem I mutationis circa formam
actualem M, alterationis citra formam accidentalem CE
et sic nee hie I sicut hie CE, sic nee hie V
[3.3]
Intelligendo consequens I intendendo consequens V
copulat vage I copulatur vage V
supposito futuri signato I supposito futuri signando V
concedo quod si I concedendo quod si E
si hoc est I si hoc erit CEV
ergo hoc erit I iter. C, ergo hoc erit secundum (vel sed) hoc erit
add. E
erit per infinita I in add. M
quodlibet sequitur aliud I aliud cσrr. mg. ex ad C, id est add. M
non eiusdem quantitatis I non tamen eiusdem quantitatis M
erit per infinita instantia I per infinita instantia erit V
sed est fallacia consequentis I sed erit fallacia consequentis V
quoniam antecedens est verum I quoniam antecedens erit verum
V
quae signari potest I post de minima parte temporis M, quae assig-
nari potest V
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quodlibet est post aliud I quodlibet aliud V, quodlibet est prius
aliud C
sed "semper" distribuit I sed semper describit M
pro omni parte I Alio modo potest. • • tendit ad non esse transp.
ex 3.2 M
accipitur quod consequens I accipitur quod consequentia V
est indeterminate verum I est indeterminata verum V
"hoc erit" de I hoc hoc erit CE, hoc de M
sit determinate verum I supposito tamen add. (tamen exp.) V
nam demonstrato supposito I nam coπ. in non C, nam supposito
determinato M, nam demonstratio supposito V
futuro, ut Antichristus • . . verum—supposito I om. horn. CE
Antichristus I anticristo M
Unde per accidens I verumtamen per accidens M
[3.4]
patet in positione I patet in ratione M, patet in quaestione EV
[3.5]
in VI huius in loco suo I VI huius in suo loco M et add. interl. in
quaestione septima
[3.6]
ergo immediate ante I ergo ante immediate M
Nam, ut dictum est I non ut dictum est CE
signato aliquo indivisibili I signato aliud indivisibile C, signato
aliquid indivisibile E, signato aliquod indivisibile V
nihil est dare immediatum | nihil est immediatum dare M
sibi nee divisible | sibi V
sibi nee divisibile . . . est dare immediatum om. horn. CE
nihil est dare immediatum I nihil est immediatum dare M
nee immediatum post I nee immediate post C
[3.7.1]
quoddam continuum terminatum I quod continuum terminatum
C, continuum terminatum E
et esse cadat I cadat MV
fieri medium I super medium C
sed intelligit I si intelligat V
inter quodcumque instans signatum I inter quaecumque signatum
M
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non esse et • . . in quo est sub om. horn. E
esse cadit fieri I esse cadat fieri V
Sic concedo hie I et concedo hoc V, sic concedo M
inter hoc instans I inter hoc M
in quo ultimo est I in quo est M, in quo ultimum est CE
in quo est non I in quo non est V
in illo medio mobile I in isto medio mobile M
non est non calidissimum I non est calidissimum MV
est tamen sub alio I esse tamen sub alio EM, erit tamen sub alio
V
nee est dare primum | nee est primum CE
[3.7.2]
dicendum quod calidum, frigidum I dicendum quod caliditas, frigid-
itas V
alios terminos habens prout consequitur I alios terminos habet
potest consequi V
formam aeris I forma aeris V
Ergo si ratio habeat difficultatem I ideo si ratio habet difficultatem
V, diffinitam (?) add. E
hoc quod ponit I simul add. M
remiss[issim]um I suum CE
circa aliquod corpus I contra aliquod corpus V
aliquod corpus naturale I et add. C
puta I et tu praem. CE
circa ignem vel aerem I contra ignem vel aerem V
impossibile est quod quiescat I impossibile est quod quiescant V
remississimo I remisso EMV
Nam, cum omnia I vel cum omnia C
omnia talia corpora I omnia corpora talia M
talis formae in quo I illius formae in quo V
ita non contingit dare ultimum gradum I ut non contingit dare
ultimum gradus C
caliditas ultimo est I caliditas est ultimo E, est caliditas ultimo M
sed sicut terminatur I sicut terminatur E, si sic terminatur C
nee remissio in qualitatibus I nee remissio in qualibus V
vel etiam intensio I vel etiam intentio V
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quod aliquid posset I quod aliquid possit M
aliquod ultimum in quo est I ultimum aliquod in quo est M
[3.7.3]
Concessum enim est I Concessum est M
quod ignis possit I quod ignis posset EV
[3.7.4]
scilicet calidissimus, vel potest I scilicet calidissimum vel potest
CV, scilicet calidissimus potest M
propriae naturae non admixtum I propriae naturae admixtum CE,
a add. E
in medio sphaerae suae I in medio suae sphaerae M
sic ignis bene potest I sic ignis potest bene V
et quantum est ex I m quantum est ex b
ex se ilium | ex se istum M
gradum sibi determinat I gradum sibi determinet C
tamen nee sub gradu I nee tamen sub gradu V
quern potest habere a I quod potest habere ac, quern potest habere
patiendo a EV
sit naturaliter frigida I sit frigida naturaliter M
esse calidiorem aere I esse calidiorem aeris C
[3.8.1]
Ad ultimam rationem I Ad ultimum M
non est eadem causa I non est causa eadem M
gradus mutatio continua I continua corr. ex continue C
se tenet ex parte I pendet ex parte V
quamvis non sit dare primum mutatum I cum non sit dare primum
mutatum M, quamvis non sit dare mutatum E
potentia, contingit tamen dare primum mutatum esse in om. horn.
E
contingit tamen dare I contingit dare tamen M
Nam ille gradus manens idem I Nam iste gradus manens idem
MV, Nam ille gradus idem manens E
non mutatur, sed quaecumque I non movetur sed quaecumque M
tollit ilium gradum I tollit corr. interl ex intelligit M et habet istum
pro ilium
et ideo corruptio I et non corruptio C
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illius gradus non I istius gradus non M
per aliquid incompossibile I per aliquod incompossibile V, per
aliquid per imcompossibile E
quod sit primus terminus illius I qui sit primus terminus illius CE,
qui sit terminus primus istius M
inductum esse I inductum est E
ante quemcumque gradum I ante quemcumque E
[3.8.2]
Adhuc posset I Ad hoc posset M
quod non est dare I non est dare V (fσrtasse recte)
absque distinctione I absque determinatione M
non est dare ultimum | est dare ultimum CEV, non (suppl. mg)
est ultimum dare M
[3.83]
Philosophus nee illam I Philosophus nee istam M
movet nee earn. • . scilicet in igne ora. CE
movet nee earn I movet nee ipsam M
fieri in generabilibus et corruptibilibus I fieri in generationibus et
corruptionibus M
in igne et aere I in igne et aeris CE
et talibus formis . • . dare ultimum non esse om. V
terminatur ad generationem I terminatur ad aggregationem C
generationem esse alterius I generationem alterius E
est universaliter verum | universaliter verum E
dare primum posterioris I dare posterioris V
PASSAGES FROM BURLEY
I add here a listing of passages from Burley's De instantί
that are found in Wylton's question. The citations to page and line
numbers following each quotation from Burley refer to the edition of
De instanti by H. and C. Shapiro in "De primo et ultimo instanti des
Walter Burley," Archiv fur Geschichte der PMosophie 47 (1965): 159-
173. Since this edition of Burley's De instanti is rather unreliable, I
have on several points consulted the Citta del Vaticano, Biblioteca
Apostolica, MS. Vat. lat. 4545.
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Far [1Λ] Ed adhuc confirmatur sic: omne quod est in tempore est
in instanti, ita quod non est in tempore nisi quia in instanti; ergo si
habet esse finitum, habet aliquod instans ultimum in quo ultimo habet
esse, quia, ex quo habet esse finitum, habet aliquam mensuram in qua
finitur suum esse, et ista mensura non est tempus nisi quia instans est;
ergo habet instans in quo finitur suum esse, et necessario est ultimum
instans sui esse; sed res permanens non habet esse in tempore nisi
quia in instanti; ergo est dare ultimum instans in quo res permanens
habet esse. (Shapiro 163.35-42)
For [1.2] Arguo septimo ad secundam conclusionem sic: cuiuslibet
finiti, ex ea parte qua finitum est, est dare terminum intrinsecum
ipsum terminantem, quia aliter non esset finitum ex ilia parte; sed esse
durativum Sortis est quoddam finitum etiam ex parte post; igitur ex
parte post habet terminum intrinsecum ipsum terminantem; ergo est
dare ultimum esse Sortis, quia tempus ipsius durativi esse est finitum
tarn ex parte post quam ex parte ante. Igitur qua ratione est dare
terminum intrinsecum ex parte ante, eadem ratione est dare terminum
intrinsecum a parte post. Si igitur est dare primum esse Sortis, ita est
dare ultimum esse Sortis. (Shapiro 163.11-19)
For [13] Tertio probatur quod est dare ultimum instans in quo res
permanens habet esse. Probo sic: si non esset dare ultimum instans
rei permanentis, semper duraret; consequens est impossibile; ergo illud
ex quo sequitur. Consequentiam probo sic, quia, si non esset dare
ultimum instans in quo Sortes habet esse, tune sequitur "Sortes in
hoc instanti est; igitur in aliquo alio instanti erit," quia cum hoc
instans non sit ultimum esse Sortis nee esse possit, oportet, si sit in
hoc instanti, quod sit adhuc in alio. Et adveniente illo alio instanti,
cum illud non sit ultimum, oportet quod sit post illud instans in aliquo
alio, et cum illud aliud non sit ultimum, oportet dare quod adhuc sit in
alio, et sic semper. Ergo, si non est dare ultimum instans in quo Sortes
habet esse, sequitur quod Sortes semper erit. Et sicut est de Sorte, ita
est de quolibet alio conceptu permanente. (Shapiro 160.33-44)
For [1 A] Nono probatur consequentia sic: non currere est res perma-
nens, et tamen contingit dare ultimum instans non cursus. Nam in
primo instanti temporis mensurantis cursum non est cursus, tune non
cursus est ultimum; ergo est dare ultimum instans rei permanentis.
(Shapiro 163.43-164.2)
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For [1.5] Sexto ad eandem conclusionem, Aristoteles, VI Physicσrumy
arguit sic: si motus esset in instanti, ergo in quolibet instanti [instanti
scripsU spatio MS.] et per consequens in ultimo. Eodem modo ego arguo
formaliter: forma permanens est nata esse in instanti; ergo in quolibet
instanti, et per consequens in ultimo, vel ratio Philosophi [ideo] non
valet ibi. (Shapiro 163.20-24)
For [1.7.1] Secundo probatur eadem conclusio sic: ponatur quod aliq-
uid quiescat in gradu caloris vel caliditatis perfectissimo per totum
tempus dCy et in instanti c sit primo illud approximatum summo
frigido in ilia proportione in qua hoc sit natum agere et illud pati.
Isto casu posito, certum est quod in c est calidissimum, et numquam
post c est calidissimum. Et quod in c est calidissimum apparet, quia
continue prius fuit calidissimum, et in c non est actio, quia actio
non est in instanti; ergo adhuc remanet calidissimum in c. Et quod
numquam post c erit calidissimum probo, quia, si sic, sequitur quod
agens esset approximatum passo per tempus in quo hoc natum est
agere et illud pati, et tamen nee hoc ageret nee illud pateretur, quod
est impossibile. Et [quod] sequitur hoc quod agens approximatum passo
per tempus in quo hoc natum est agere et tamen nee hoc ageret
nee illud pateretur, si post c remanet calidissimum, probo, quia, si
frigidissimum ageret in isto tempore, cum sua actio fiat continue
removendo caliditatem in passo, oporteret dicere quod caliditas in
passo remitteretur, quia si non remitteretur, sed maneret [sub] eodem
gradu nunc ut prius, sequitur quod quiesceret, et tune simul quiesceret
et moveretur. (Shapiro 161.1-17)
For [1.7.2] Huic rationi forte diceretur quod est dare ultimum instans
in quo aliquid est calidissimum. (Shapiro 161.18-19)
For [1.7.3] Contra, probo quod non sit dare ultimum instans in quo
forma sit sub gradu intensissimo. Nam per Philosophum, V Physicσrum,
omne quod prius est non ens et postea ens oportet quod aliquando fiat
ens. Aliam etiam probationem ponit Philosophus, quod, cum aliquid
fit, non est. Ex his arguo sic: si post illud instans in quo tu dicis
ultimum esse in quo hoc est calidissimum fiat non calidissimum,
oporteret fieri per aliquod medium. Certum est enim quod non fit
non calidissimum in instanti in quo est hoc calidissimum, cum sic
mutari non possit in instanti; nee etiam sic fit non calidissimum
quando erit iam non calidissimum; ergo in aliquo tempore fit non
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calidissimum; sed quod fit non est; ergo in illo tempore medio non est
nisi calidissimum. Ex quo sequitur quod datum esse ultimum non est
ultimum, cum post illud instans adhuc maneat calidissimum. Similiter
cum arguitur de isto ultimo dato, ita argui potest de quolibet ultimo
in infinitum, et per consequens impossibile est dare ultimum instans
in quo est calidissimum. (Shapiro 161.19-33)
For [1.7.41 Item, probo quod, si est dare ultimum gradum, etiam est
dare ultimum formae [formae scripsi, formale MS.] absolutae, scilicet
ultimum in quo aliquid est calidum. Nam sicut est dare aliquem
gradum maximum caloris secundum quern aliquid est calidissimum,
ita est dare aliquem remissum secundum quern aliquid est [remissum]
imperfectissimum \forte pro: imperfectissimae] caliditatis. Nam sicut in
formis naturalibus est dare maximum, ita et minimum. Pono ergo quod
aliquid quiescat per totum a tempus sub isto gradu caloris maxime
remisso et quod in instanti c sit primo sibi approximatum corpus
fπgidum. Tune quaero: aut illud corpus remississime calidum post c
erit sub isto gradu caloris aut non. Si detur quod sic, sequitur, ut prius
dictum est, quod, agens approximatum passo in debita proportione et
in debita mensura nee hoc agit, nee illud patitur, quod est inconve^
niens. Si detur aliud membrum, quod numquam post c est sub isto
gradu, nee sub gradu perfectionis caloris, et per consequens in c est
sub ultimo calore, quia calor non potest esse sine aliquo gradu caloris;
igitur c est ultimum [instans] in quo calor est in isto subiecto, et
sic, si sit dare ultimum in gradibus, erit dare ultimum instans formae
absolutae. (Shapiro 161.34-162.5)
For [2.1] Si autem loquamur de re permanente durante per tempus,
dico quod per talem rem possum duo intelligere, scilicet vel formam
positivam tantum, cuius [esse] existit totum simul in tempore, vel
formam indifferentem ad formam positivam vel privativam, dummodo
talis sit quod duret per tempus et habeat omnes suas partes simul vel
ei [ei scripsi, enim MS.] non repugnet omnes suas partes habere simul.
Exemplum secundi: non albedo vel non album est forma privativa
habens [esse] totum [totum scripsi, tota MS.] simul durans per tempus.
Si autem loquamur de forma permanente positiva durante per teπv
pus, in esse et conservari non dependente a re successiva, adhuc
haec est duplex, quia vel ista forma habet latitudinem in gradibus
ita quod, corrupto suo gradu, potest forma remanere eadem simul
sub alio gradu, vel ista forma importat talem perfectionem secundum
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gradum punctualem. Exemplum primi: sicut albedo, nigredo, caliditas,
frigiditas, ignis, aer, aqua. Omnia ista habent latitudinem in gradibus.
Accidentia enim praedicta et consimilia habent latitudinem per se
graduum; sed substantiae, ut ignis, aer et huiusmodi, habent lati-
tudinem graduum per accidens. Unde communiter accidentia et omnia
ista sub tota latitudine possunt salvari. Exemplum secundi: in motu
locali ubi in hoc instanti signato in quo mobile est in primo instanti
motus vel in medio. Consimiliter, bicubitum, tricubitum in motu
augmenti. Similiter, calidissimum, fπgidissimum et omnis huiusmodi
gradus alterationis. (Shapiro 165.16-36)
For [2.2] Si autem loquimur de re permanente positiva cuius perfectio
habet latitudinem graduum, dico quod non est dare ultimum instans
in quo talis res habet esse. Et in talibus rebus habet intelligi processus
Philosophi VIII Physicσrum. (Shapiro 170.36-39)
For [2.3] Unde breviter in talibus formis habentibus latitudinem
graduum, quando corrumpuntur per alterationem, non est dare ul-
timum instans esse talis formae, quia, si aliquis daret instans ultimum
in quo est forma prior, cum illud sit tune instans ultimum formae
prioris et primum esse posterioris, aliter non esset tempus continuum,
et tune necesse esset concedere vel quod aliquid, quando factum est,
non esset, vel quod aliquid simul esset et non esset, quorum utrumque
est impossibile totaliter. Et causa huius est quia in transmutatione talis
formae mutatio continua cadit supra priorem formam, quae mutatio
terminatur ad mutatum esse illius formae, quod est eius corruptivum
et inductivum formae contrariae, et per consequens forma prior in
illo instanti non est cum sua corruptione, cum corrupta sit; et ideo
necesse est dare in talibus quod in illo instanti, ultimo scilicet \forte
pro: secundum] subiectum, res denominetur a posteriori passione, ut
dicit Philosophus. (Shapiro 171.28-42)
Far [2.4] See Shapiro 165.36-40 and 169.40-170.35.
For [2.5] at "Si per rem permanentem. . . ." See Shapiro 165.41-43
and 172.1-10.
For [2.5.] at "Si loquamur de negatione. . . ." See Shapiro 165.43-
166.5.
For [2.5] at "Si primo modo numquam" See Shapiro 172.11-20.
